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Executive Summary 
New Zealand has historically enjoyed early and significant adoption of Information and 
Communications Technologies (ICTs).  If, as has been espoused by organizations such as the 
OECD, increased economic and social benefits were to accrue from the use of these technologies, 
New Zealand would appear to be well placed relative to its OECD counterparts to enjoy these 
benefits.   
 
However, despite OECD-leading levels of Internet uptake and usage generally, New Zealand lies 
well to the bottom half of the OECD in respect of uptake of broadband technologies per capita.  This 
has been interpreted as a ‘problem’ for New Zealand, as it has been widely presumed that if basic 
Internet access technologies are beneficial, then widespread use of faster and more capable Internet 
technologies such as broadband should accelerate the accrual of these gains.   
 
New Zealand’s failure to record significant broadband penetration levels has resulted in an 
examination of the underlying information transportation mechanisms, in particular the 
telecommunications infrastructures, in order to determine whether the poor performance is a 
symptom of market imperfections.  This examination has been especially interesting given that New 
Zealand has been one of only four OECD countries (the others being Switzerland, Mexico and 
Turkey) to neither allow for, nor impose, the industry-specific regulatory intervention of compulsory 
Local Loop Unbundling (LLU).  This intervention has been widely promoted within the OECD as a 
means of opening up monopoly networks to competition, and by this mechanism, encouraging the 
growth of broadband penetration. 
 
This paper adopts a productivity-based approach to assess the state of the New Zealand broadband 
market.  This approach presumes that broadband penetration is a proxy for the ultimate objective of 
increased economic and social benefit, which can be measured as increases in productivity.  The 
state of the market is examined from the technology-agnostic perspective of competition for the 
provision of broadband services, in terms of availability and price.  This is then juxtaposed with a 
detailed analysis of New Zealand broadband purchase and utilization behaviors.  Broadband 
purchase is seen in this analysis as merely another technology that may enable increased 
productivity from the use of information exchange over the Internet. 
 
The paper finds that there is substantial evidence of New Zealand’s ability to access the benefits of 
an Information Economy from the already extensive use of the Internet.  Furthermore, far from 
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failing to capitalise upon the benefits of broadband, New Zealand exhibits no sign of any evidence 
of failures of the market to provide multiple technology platform competition (six infrastructures) 
widespread coverage (two technologies – mobile and satellite – claim near nationwide coverage, 
while the third – DSL – has 85% coverage) low prices relative to comparative benchmark countries 
and one of the highest levels of business uptake of the technology in the OECD.  As New Zealand’s 
businesses are typically small relative to other countries, this business result is impressive.   
 
Moreover, business penetration of the technology is amongst the highest in the OECD, with a 
conservative calculation revealing over 8% of New Zealand’s significant business units using DSL 
alone, compared to 3.5% in the UK and 3% in Australia.  In addition, regional business penetration 
shows no sign of a significant rural-urban divide, with second and third highest penetration levels 
per significant geographic unit (i.e. sites where business is conducted) being recorded in provincial 
areas Otago and Gisborne respectively.   
 
If New Zealand has a ‘broadband problem’ at all, it relates to low levels of residential uptake of the 
technology.  However, the available evidence is not consistent with this being a result of a supply-
side ‘problem’.  Rather, both lower residential connection purchase and higher levels of business 
connection purchase appear to be almost solely due to pricing arbitrage in respect of the costs of 
accessing information transport via the Internet.  Despite low prices, levels of business data 
exchange are very low, suggesting that the capabilities of the technology (speed and capacity) are 
not the primary reason for purchase.  As the price of broadband is, for some business users, less than 
the price of dial-up given that dial-up access incurs per-minute charging for telephony access, DSL 
merely offers a more cost-effective way to access the Internet.  Substitution is occurring principally 
because of the productivity effects of conducting low levels of information exchange using the 
cheaper technology.   It is noted, though, that the wide variety of volume plans offered in New 
Zealand, as opposed to flat rate plans used elsewhere, enable small users to economically access the 
technology by not forcing them to subsidise heavier users via the flat-rate plans.  This is a significant 
additional factor in encouraging New Zealand’s small businesses to use broadband, relative to the 
countries where flat-rate business plans prevail.  
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Residential purchase, however, is relatively more expensive than dial-up, as these customers do not 
face a per-call or per-minute charge to access the Internet.  Broadband purchase is being delayed not 
because the technology is too expensive, but because access to the extremely high quality New 
Zealand dial-up product is so cheap.  As average information exchange usage is low, the point has 
not yet been reached for the majority of users whereby the amount of information transferred, or the  
portfolio of applications used, require the capabilities of broadband technologies.  The benefits of 
faster exchange are not as yet sufficient to justify the additional costs, so the efficiency-maximising 
technology selection remains dial-up.  This does not mean that these customers are not benefiting 
from Internet exchange – far from it, as New Zealanders are amongst the heaviest Internet-using 
populations in the OECD.  Rather, the most efficient access technology choice with current levels of 
usage and applications remains dial-up.  Indeed, encouraging use of broadband merely because it 
exists, in isolation from these productivity considerations will actually lower productivity if the 
benefits are not valued in excess of the additional costs.  
 
However, the very low levels of both business and residential information transfer revealed in this 
study are a factor of significant concern.  The median monthly information exchange for residential 
users is less than 1000Mb, and even the average amount of transfer by customers of the package 
with a 5000Mb monthly allowance is less than 1500Mb.  This implies that overall; there is a 
shortage of applications from which New Zealand users derive productivity or utility benefits.  This 
is quite clearly a demand-side problem that infrastructure regulation is impotent to address.  
Furthermore, it may not be a New Zealand specific factor.  It is a problem that has been identified 
already in the United States market. For example, Ferguson identifies low United States broadband 
uptake as ‘The United States Broadband Problem’1, and Haring et al. observe “we would put our 
chips on demand rather than supply constraints, and on the relative paucity of applications as being 
the main ‘culprits’ restraining take-up” 2. 
 
The New Zealand data, without a significant cable product, have enabled analysis of broadband 
uptake independent of the distortions that bundled content and infrastructure packages such as cable 
TV content and cable Internet access introduce in other jurisdictions. This analysis therefore adds 
insight to wider broadband uptake ‘problems’ identified in other jurisdictions.  Combined with the 
comparative absence of overt regulatory intervention that has prevailed New Zealand country 
throughout the development of the Internet and broadband access technologies3, this unique 
                                                     
1 Ferguson, Charles.  The United States Broadband Problem: Analysis and Policy Recommendations. Brookings Working 
Paper May 31, 2002. 
2 Haring, John; Jeffrey H. Rohlfs and Harry M. Shooshan.  2002.  Propelling the Broadband Bandwagon.  Bethesda, 
Maryland: Strategic Policy Research.  http://www.oftel.gov.uk op. cit. p 76.  
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3 Boles de Boer, David; and Lewis Evans.  The Economic Efficiency of Telecommunications in a Deregulated Market: the 
Case of New Zealand.  Economic Record 72(216), 1996, 24-39; extended in Howell and Obren. (2002).  Broadband 
Diffusion: Testing for Vintage Capital, Learning by Doing, Information Barriers and Network Effects. ISCR Research 
Paper.  http://www.sicr.org.nz.  
infrastructure, applications and regulatory environment provides an interesting counterfactual from 
which other OECD countries may learn4. 
 
From a policy perspective, as the ‘problem’ of low broadband uptake appears to be a demand-side 
rather than a supply-side problem in New Zealand, the real challenge lies in identifying ways of 
stimulating demand in a productivity-enhancing manner.  Whilst creating awareness of the benefits 
of existing applications may overcome information barriers and enable latent productivity gains 
from existing applications, the real benefits lie in stimulating the creation of new productive uses for 
Internet information exchange.  It is far from clear that infrastructure-focused thrusts such as LLU 
can address this problem satisfactorily, and may indeed be damaging if the objective becomes 
meeting a predefined a technology penetration statistic rather than focusing on productivity 
improvements.  Furthermore, there needs to be clarity whether the greatest productivity gains from 
ICTs will arise from Internet-based solutions, which focus on productive information transfers 
between discrete entities or locations, or the productive use of information within these entities, 
which does not require information transmission via the Internet.  
 
The New Zealand broadband market has, within the existing frameworks, delivered a competitive 
environment with resources focused upon encouraging productive use of the technology.  It is 
debatable that there is any ‘supply-side’ problem that needs fixing, and supply-side intervention in a 
single broadband technology (telephony) at this point may jeopardise the competitive balance and 
significant benefits that this market has already delivered by threatening the financial viability of 
alternative technology platforms that are more capable of servicing topographically challenging 
areas than the telephony-based product.    
 
The conclusions of this paper strongly advocates that the more significant productivity gains from 
the use of the Internet stand to be derived from demand-side application development and use rather 
than supply-side infrastructure supply development, especially in a market where it is far from clear 
that there are any significant supply-side problems.   
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Introduction 
Broadband Internet access technologies are widely acknowledged as the frontier digital 
communications access technology5 of the ‘Information Economy’ due to the faster transmission 
speeds and greater information transfer capacities that they offer.  Thus, development of broadband 
access infrastructures has been given increasing prominence in the communications policies of the 
majority of OECD countries6, based upon the presumption that advanced communications 
technologies are of critical importance in boosting productivity growth and thus increasing welfare7.   
The widely-accepted premise has been that “the current bottleneck to growth in the communications 
sector, and beyond for areas such as electronic commerce, is the limitations of local access 
networks” as  “there is usually one, or at best two, networks passing most homes and businesses in 
OECD countries”8.   This presumption has spawned a host of policy and regulatory interventions 
across the OECD focused upon freeing up the perceived bottlenecks and laying the foundations for 
expansion and uptake of the broadband technology platforms that are perceived as “a significant 
harbinger and bellwether of future economic prospects”9. 
 
The OECD acknowledges that infrastructure availability and access alone is insufficient to ensure 
that the promised economic and social benefits ensue.  “Having the equipment and networks alone is 
not enough to derive economic benefits.  Other factors, such as the regulatory environment, the 
climate for trust and security in a digital economy, the availability of appropriate skills, the ability to 
change organizational set-up, as well as the strength of accompanying innovations in ICT 
applications, also affect the ability of firms to seize the benefits of ICT”10.   Nonetheless, whilst 
there is no simple metric via which to measure a country’s potential to reap the economic and social 
benefits of the Internet generally, and broadband networks in particular11, a general consensus has 
emerged that the rollout of broadband access in OECD countries provides a ‘litmus test’ of the 
potential to reap the promised economic and social benefits in the future.  Underpinning this 
                                                     
5The Internet is presumed to be a General Purpose Technology (as defined by Helpman, Elhanan and Manuel Trajtenberg.  
1996. Diffusion of General Purpose Technologies. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 5773.  
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5773) and broadband technologies the current frontier in Howell, Bronwyn and Mark Obren.  
2002 op. cit.; 
See, for example, OECD.  Working Party on Telecommunication and Information Services Policies.  2001.  The 
Development of Broadband Access in OECD Countries.  Paris: OECD paper DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2001)2/FINAL p 4;  and 
NOIE.  2000.  E-Commerce Beyond 2000.  Final Report.  Canberra: DOCITA pp 1-12.  
7 OECD Working Party on Telecommunication and Information Services Policies.  2002.  Broadband Access for Business.  
Paris: OECD paper DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2003)3/FINAL pp 4-5.  
8 OECD (2001) ibid p 4.  
9 Haring, et al. (2002) op. cit. Executive Summary.  
10 OECD Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial Level.  2003.  Seizing the Benefits of ICT in a Digital Economy. 
Paris: OECD.  p 11.  
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consensus is the presumption that infrastructure availability stands as the necessary component 
enabling access to the promised benefits12.  Without infrastructures, the benefits of Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) cannot ensue, and impediments to making infrastructure 
widely and cheaply available are presumed to be the underlying cause of the perceived bottlenecks 
delaying benefit accrual in some economies.     
 
To this end, the OECD continues to emphasize the relative importance of access to broadband 
infrastructures, and to stress that “the most fundamental policy available to OECD governments to 
boost broadband access is infrastructure competition”13.  The OECD’s ideal environment for 
boosting broadband access is one of multiple competing broadband infrastructures, owned by legally 
separate entities, as “the countries with alternative infrastructure available to business users are 
developing broadband access much faster than in those markets where there is only one, or at best 
two, platforms available to provide broadband access”14 and there is evidence that common 
ownership of competing platforms is strongly correlated with slower rollout of broadband 
platforms15.   Regulatory intervention such as unbundling local loops and mandatory line sharing are 
seen as tools that will “open up the networks of players in dominant positions to competitive 
forces”16 as a stepping-stone on the path towards full facilities-based competition17.  The corollary of 
this is that if full facilities-based competition already exists as espoused in the OECD’s ‘ideal’ 
environment, then intervention for the purpose of ‘unplugging the bottleneck’ is unnecessary, as 
access bottlenecks should not exist in such competitive environments.   If the business case for 
purchase and use of the technology exists, then there will be no longer any impediments to accessing 
it for these productive purposes. 
 
Thus it is apposite, in advance of the New Zealand Commerce Commission’s pending decision upon 
whether to recommend mandatory Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) as allowed under section 64 of the 
Telecommunications Act 2001, to examine the state of New Zealand’s broadband infrastructure 
market.  Despite the fact that the OECD identifies New Zealand as one of the leading nations in the 
uptake of ICTs (“some countries lead in the uptake of ICT on almost every indicator, notably the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
11 See Appendix 1. 
12 OECD.  1997.  Measuring Electronic Commerce.  Paris: OECD.  
13 OECD (2001) op. cit. p 4.  
14 OECD (2002) op. cit. p 4.  
15 OECD (2001) op. cit. p 19.  
16 OECD (2001) op. cit. p 4.  
 
 6/11/2003                                                            9 
17 Shelanski, Howard A.  Competition and Regulation in Broadband Services.  Chapter 8 in Crandall, Robert W.; and 
James H. Alleman (eds).  2002.  Broadband:  Should We Regulate High-Speed Internet Access?  Washington, D.C.: AIE-
Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies.  p 175 
United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, the Nordic countries and the Netherlands”)18, a 
widespread perception persists that New Zealand is failing in its ability to capitalise upon the 
promises and benefits of ICTs19.  This perception arises as, despite its high level of uptake of other 
ICTs, New Zealand’s penetration of broadband connections as a proportion of the population is low 
by OECD standards20.    
 
This paper examines the nature of the Internet market generally in New Zealand, and the specific 
availability and use of broadband Internet access, in relation to infrastructure availability and 
pricing.  New Zealand’s position is compared to other OECD countries in order to assess the 
country’s relative performance, and hence its relative ability to capitalise upon the promises of an 
“Information Economy”.   
 
  
                                                     
18 OECD (2003) op. cit. p 10.  
19 For example, Chris Barton’s article in the New Zealand Herald 16 Apr 2003 
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20 New Zealand Commerce Commission.  April 2003.  Telecommunications Act 2001: Section 64 Reviews Into 
Unbundling The Local Loop Network and the Fixed Public Data Network: Issues Paper.  Wellington: Commerce 
Commission.  http://www.comcom.govt.nz p 101.  
Methodology 
For the purposes of this analysis, it is presumed that the Internet is a General Purpose Technology 
(GPT), and broadband technologies, as the most capable, represent the current frontier of Internet 
access technologies21.   This is consistent with the OECD framework for measuring the benefits of 
Electronic Commerce, which is neutral in respect of the access technology used22.  
 
The subsequent analysis presumes that the Internet GPT provides transportation of digitised data 
between points, much as a trucking firm transports physical goods.  The digitised data is constructed 
and consumed at the end points, independent of the trucking mechanism.  Digitised data will be 
moved only if there is a demand for transport, determined by the construction and consumption 
processes.  Thus, ‘available’ infrastructure will be utilised only if there is a product to be moved.  
Whilst it is acknowledged that in some instances, if transportation does not exist, a product will not 
be constructed, even if consumption demand exists at the other end, if transportation capability 
exists and it is not utilised, then it is presumed that products requiring transport do not exist, as there 
is not a demand for them that makes production economically viable.   
 
In the transportation analogy, narrowband and broadband technologies represent trucks of two 
differing speeds and capacities within the Internet GPT.  One (broadband) is merely faster and more 
capacious than the other (narrowband).  The decision of which transportation mechanism to use is 
influenced by availability in the first instance, but in the presence of choice the infrastructure that 
yields the most efficient outcome is the one selected.  If speed and volume are necessary, then the 
faster technology is purchased, but where either will suffice, the faster technology will be purchased 
only if the benefits it offers outweigh the additional costs associated with the faster speed and greater 
volume.   
 
Thus, the market for all Internet access technologies represents an interaction of supply of 
information transportation infrastructures of various types that enable access to occur, and demand 
for that access underpinned by the demand for applications that require the capabilities of the access 
                                                     
21 Helpman E. and Trajtenberg M. (1996) Diffusion of General Purpose Technologies. National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper 5773.  
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5773 
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22 OECD (1997), (2003)  op. cit.; Colecchia, Alessandra. Defining and Measuring Electronic Commerce: Towards the 
development of an OECD methodology. Conference on the Measurement of Electronic Commerce, Singapore 6-8 
December 1999. 
technologies23.  Purchase and use of Internet access infrastructures is a combination of infrastructure 
supply and user demand.  User demand is a derived demand determined by the applications that 
Internet access users employ.  In turn, demand for these applications is determined by the benefit 
users derive from the application24.  Business users will employ an application and purchase the 
required Internet access if use of the application increases business profit.  Residential consumers 
will employ an application and purchase the required Internet access if use of that application raises 
the consumer’s utility within the consumer’s budget constraint.    
 
Whilst absence of infrastructure availability stands as a barrier to gaining potential profits and 
increasing individual utility, if infrastructure availability is not a constraint, then the decision to 
purchase Internet access becomes purely one of the ability to increase either profits or individual 
utility.  Failure to purchase access where there is no availability constraint implies that there is no 
productivity or utility gain available.  This may be because either applications exist but the benefits 
available at the current prices are insufficient, or that applications which offer productivity or utility 
gains are not available25.   Moreover, users will substitute the frontier technology (i.e. broadband) 
for the existing technology (i.e. narrowband) when the productivity benefits of the frontier 
technology exceed those of the current technology26. 
 
In addressing these issues, the analysis examines all facets of the New Zealand broadband market 
that influence the ability for supply of, and demand for, the technology to interact.  The analysis 
embraces the extent to which New Zealanders use the Internet generally and the applications that 
characterise Internet use, as this determines whether there is a base level of demand for digital data 
transport (i.e. is there a cargo to transport?).  It then examines the supply-side availability of 
broadband infrastructures, the speeds of these technologies and the prices at which these 
technologies are made available to users (i.e. are there enough trucks of the appropriate size and 
price available?).  Next, it examines the extent of purchase and use of broadband Internet access as a 
reflection of the interaction of supply and demand factors (i.e. how well are the existing trucks 
actually being used?).  This analysis exposes a dilemma: despite very high levels of Internet use 
generally, desirable market conditions including wide availability of, and comparatively low prices 
for, broadband Internet access, New Zealand penetration of this technology is poor compared to the 
                                                     
23 Crawford, David W.  1997.  Internet Services: A Market for Bandwidth or Communication?  Chapter in McKnight, Lee 
W.; and Joseph P. Bailey (eds).  Internet Economics.  Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. p 
380. 
24 Howell and Obren (2002) op. cit.    
25 For a full discussion of this analogy, see Howell, Bronwyn.  2003.  ‘Solving’ the Broadband ‘Problem’: a Challenge for 
Regulators or Producers?  Wellington:ISCR Research Paper http://www.iscr.org.nz  
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rest of the OECD.  On first blush, this anomaly appears quite counter-intuitive, given New Zealand’s 
reputation as an early adopter and extensive user of the Internet.  The paper proceeds to explore this 
dilemma using a detailed analysis of the demand-side substitution decision that underpins 
progression to more capable technologies within the GPT framework.  Finally, the analysis uses 
these findings to draw some conclusions about the ability and desirability of policy interventions to 
‘redress’ this ‘problem’.  
 
The Primary Data 
The primary New Zealand data used in this analysis come from the ISCR Telecommunications 
Database.  This database contains connection and utilisation information from New Zealand’s 
incumbent telecommunications company (Telecom New Zealand Ltd.) that provides in excess of 
96% of local telephony connections, the largest Internet Service Provider (Xtra), which has in excess 
of 50% market share, and the longest-serving broadband provider (CityLink), which has been 
providing broadband Internet access since 1996.   
 
The Telecom data provide connection and utilisation information on all Digital Subscriber Line 
(DSL) broadband connections by business and residential categories, and by geographic region.  
DSL has in excess of 90% market share of the broadband market in New Zealand27.   The data also 
contain usage figures of the dial-up Internet traffic network IPNet, which manages all dial-up 
Internet traffic originating and terminating on the 96% of local access lines that Telecom manages.  
This is presumed to be a close approximation of the entire national consumption for dial-up Internet 
use, given the very large market share.  Telecom DSL usage data are thus presumed to be population 
usage totals for both dial-up and DSL.   
 
The Xtra data provide counts of the number of dial-up and DSL ISP accounts of the country’s 
largest ISP.  As Xtra has over 50% market share in both the business and residential markets, it is 
presumed that Xtra’s customer base is indicative of the wider New Zealand ISP market.  National 
dial-up ISP account numbers are estimated by applying Phoenix Research market share estimates to 
the Xtra account base.  The Xtra data also provide sample months of residential DSL user 
application bases, which are presumed to be indicative of all residential DSL usage. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
26 Howell and Obren (2002) op. cit.   
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27 Extrapolating between reported penetration figures provided by each of the broadband providers, and Phoenix Research.   
The CityLink data provide usage and survey data from longstanding and experienced (‘mature’) 
business broadband users of an Ethernet LAN network.  These data provide a point of comparison 
between the observed patterns from the DSL market, and information of actual and projected 
application usage by some of the world’s most experienced broadband users.   
 
The population-based nature of the data in the ISCR database enables comprehensive analysis of 
technology uptake and utilisation based upon Statistics New Zealand’s counts of population, 
households, significant business enterprises and significant geographic business units.  The ensuing 
numbers are hence actual penetration and usage rates based upon total customer and account 
numbers, rather than the survey data that is commonly provided to measure the extent of uptake and 
usage of specific technologies.   
 
The numbers contained in this analysis (with the exception of the CityLink survey) are presented 
with the confidence that they are an accurate portrayal of the real situation in New Zealand, as they 
are not subject to sampling bias or the uncertainties associated with self-selection of respondents to 
voluntary surveys. Where there is any doubt about the extent of a statistic, the analysis takes a 
conservative approach.  Specifically, the classification of business and residential customers of 
Telecom is based upon Telecom’s database of businesses, which records some 100,000 fewer 
businesses than Statistics New Zealand’s 280,000 significant business enterprises.  The 100,000 
discrepancy implies that a significant number of small businesses by Statistics New Zealand’s 
definition may be purchasing dial-up and broadband services as residential Telecom customers.  
Thus, business penetration levels, measured using Telecom’s classification, but calculated using 
Statistics New Zealand’s business classification, represent a ‘least possible penetration level’, as the 
real penetration levels will be greater, but to an unknown extent.   
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International comparisons in this analysis wherever possible use data sourced from official reporting 
sources, such as the OECD, the Office of Telecommunications (Oftel) in the United Kingdom, the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the United States and the National Office for the 
Information Economy (NOIE) in Australia.    This approach is taken to ensure the authenticity and 
consistency of the figures for comparative purposes.  However, it is noted that in some instance even 
these data rely upon sampling processes.   Whilst this makes absolute comparison difficult given the 
population-based approach of the ISCR analysis, as survey data is more prone to error, the very 
positive comparison yielded by the New Zealand data even on this conservative basis serves to 
further reinforce the extent of New Zealand’s strong comparative position with other countries as 
displayed in the following analysis.   
Evidence from the New Zealand Internet Access Market 
As the Internet is a GPT, and broadband technologies merely one form of access to the GPT from 
which benefit is generated, then broadband and narrowband Internet access are substitutes for each 
other in the market for digital information transfer.  Hence, an understanding of the market for 
broadband services requires an understanding also of the market for all Internet access technologies, 
including broadband’s forerunner narrowband access.   
 
Empirical evidence in the New Zealand market supports the contention that the broadband Internet 
access purchase decision is a productivity-based substitution determined by a combination28 of the 
relative prices of the two technologies (both fixed and variable)29, the user’s valuation of time30, and 
the number of productivity-enhancing information exchanges that the user undertakes (generated by 
either access to multiple applications, or multiple uses of a single application)31.   This decision is 
conditioned by the availability of infrastructure, but is nonetheless the result of the intersection of 
supply and demand.   
 
Howell and Obren find that at the prices of each technology in New Zealand, where low-risk flat-
rate dial-up pricing structures are the preferred method of initial access to the Internet (80% of ISP 
accounts are effectively ‘flat-rate’ plans – greater than 150 hours per month), learning-by doing is 
the most significant determinant of the point at which a user will substitute broadband for dial-up.  
Upon gaining access to the Internet, the user accumulates learning about the applications that offer 
productivity enhancements, and uses them increasingly to the point that it becomes more productive 
to substitute to broadband, determined either by the user’s value of time, or by the data exchange 
requirements becoming too great to be serviced by a dial-up connection.  Given the predominant 
user choice of flat-rate plans, broadband infrastructure providers are limited in their ability to 
influence the point of substitution to either varying their access prices relative to dial-up, or by 
inducing the user to adopt more applications that either increase the demand for information transfer, 
or require the greater information transfer capacity of broadband (e.g. video streaming).   
 
                                                     
28 Howell and Obren (2002) op. cit.  
29 Hausman, Jerry.  2002.  Internet-Related Services: The Results of Asymmetric Regulation.  Chapter 7 in Crandall, 
Robert W.; and James H. Alleman (eds).  2002.  Broadband:  Should We Regulate High-Speed Internet Access?  
Washington, D.C.: AIE-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies.   
30 Varian, Hal.  2002.  The Demand for Bandwidth.  Chapter 4 in Crandall, Robert W.; and James H. Alleman (eds).  2002.  
Broadband:  Should We Regulate High-Speed Internet Access?  Washington, D.C.: AIE-Brookings Joint Center for 
Regulatory Studies.  
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31 Bailey, Joseph P.  1997.  The Economics of Internet Interconnection Agreements.  Chapter in McKnight, Lee W.; and 
Joseph P. Bailey (eds).  Internet Economics.  Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
The point at which a user substitutes broadband for dial-up, and hence the characteristics of the 
broadband market in New Zealand, are thus determined in large part by the usage characteristics of 
the dial-up Internet market.  Consequently, it is necessary to gain a detailed understanding of the 
Internet access market in general, and the dial-up Internet access in particular, to gain a detailed 
understanding of the broadband Internet access market in New Zealand, as the two are 
interdependent.  
 
Whilst much policy emphasis has been placed upon encouraging growth of broadband penetration, if 
the benefits of digitised information exchange are already being accrued from dial-up 
infrastructures, then the substitution to broadband will occur as soon as the productivity trade-off 
determines that it is more efficient to substitute to that method of access.  If substitution to 
broadband is not occurring, imperfections in the broadband market are not the only possible 
explanation for observations of low broadband pennetration.  It is equally possible that substitution 
delays are occurring because there are underlying imperfections in the dial-up market that are 
delaying the substitution decision, insufficient applications-based learning has occurred to date or 
that there are insufficient productivity-enhancing application usages as yet to justify the substitution, 
at the prevailing prices, for the vast majority of Internet users.  Whilst manipulating prices may bring 
forward the point at which the substitution occurs, ongoing sustainable productivity gains will occur 
only as a result of increasing productivity-raising usage.   
 
The justification for any regulatory intervention in the market for broadband services (such as LLU) 
requires an understanding of which of the causes is responsible for low levels of broadband 
purchase.  Regulatory intervention in the market for access (trucks and roads) will solve the problem 
only if there is in fact a bottleneck arising from a shortage of infrastructure (trucks and overly small 
roads).  Moreover, it is not economically reasonable to expect all users of the road to be driving 
Mack trucks and Ferraris if loads are small and the most frequent trip is to the local store for a 
newspaper and milk.  Pursuing a penetration-based measure in isolation of the productivity-based 
justifications for purchasing the technology runs the risk of investing too soon, thereby decreasing 
overall productivity.  As with any investment strategy, optimal accrual of the benefits of broadband 
requires the timing of investment in all necessary components (infrastructure, applications, user 
learning, etc.) to be co-ordinated.  Investing too soon in an expensive technology in advance of the 
additional requirements being available may result in costly assets lying underutilised while 
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capability in the complements is acquired, with associated declines in productivity32.    These 
outcomes are very real possibilities when pursuit of one metric (biggest, fastest, newest) is pursued 
in isolation from the other contextual elements.   
 
1. New Zealand Exhibits OECD-leading Internet Penetration, Utilisation 
This section examines evidence from the New Zealand market to determine whether there is any 
evidence of a market failure in either of the markets for Internet access or broadband access.  In the 
event of no such evidence being found, then the remaining conclusion is that there is an absence of 
productivity-raising demand for the technology that cannot be addressed by intervention in the 
markets for infrastructure. 
 
The ability of a country to generate economic benefit from the use of information transport lies in 
the technology-agnostic ability of individuals and businesses to access and productively employ 
information exchange.  Information exchange may occur over a variety of mechanisms (e.g. person-
to-person, computer-to-computer, person-to-computer) and media (e.g. smoke signals, voice, paper, 
digital).  The principal mechanism of widespread and flexible digital information exchange is the 
Internet.  Compelling evidence exists that New Zealanders are amongst the earliest adopters and 
most prolific users of both computer and Internet applications in the OECD.  This indicates that to 
date there is little evidence of widespread failures of investment in the underlying infrastructures to 
enable information exchange and consequent economic benefit creation via the Internet.   
1.1 Dial-Up Internet Infrastructures 
New Zealand has a record of being one of the heaviest-investing countries in Information and 
Communications technologies (ICTs) in the OECD.  New Zealand has recorded the highest 
percentage of GDP spent on ICTs in the OECD consistently over the period from 199633.  This is 
reflected in very high levels of investment in all technologies, from the underlying telephony 
infrastructures through to computer ownership and usage to Internet access. 
 
Telecommunications infrastructures provide the basis for the earliest means of Internet access – dial-
up access based upon modems.  However, data transport requires digital telephony infrastructures34. 
                                                     
32 Jovanovic, Boyan and Dmitriy Stolyarov.  2000.  Optimal Adoption of Complementary Technologies.  The American 
Economic Review.  15-29. 
33 SourceOECD Science and Technology database.   
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34 Economides, Nicholas.  2003.  US Telecommunications Today.  Forthcoming in Brown, Carol V., and Heikki Topi (eds) 
IS Management Handbook.  Baton Rouge, Florida: Auerbach Publications.  
Much of New Zealand’s high levels of ICT investment have been applied to improving and 
developing the telecommunications infrastructure, as evident in the current state of this infrastructure 
relative to that of other OECD countries.  In 1993, New Zealand with 95% led the OECD in 
digitisation.  This compares to Australia with 40%, the UK 75% and the US 85% at the same date.  
New Zealand became the fourth country in the OECD to have a fully digital network (after France, 
Luxembourg and Iceland) in 1997. Australia did not reach this milestone until 1999, at which stage 
the US level had reached only 94%35.  By 2001, the United States had achieved only 97% of digital 
access lines, whilst only 88% of Korea’s telephone lines were digital and the OECD average stood at 
97%36.  The current high quality levels and wide availability of both dial-up and broadband 
telecommunications networks in New Zealand are a reflection of the levels of historic investment 
that have occurred.  Whilst it is acknowledged that service quality and availability are in some 
instances restricted by geographical factors, given the challenging topography of the country and the 
low population density relative to many other OECD countries37, New Zealanders on average enjoy 
access to state-of-the-art telecommunications infrastructure not offered universally in other larger 
countries with much higher populations and more conducive topography.  Furthermore, New 
Zealanders have been enjoying these higher-quality services for much longer than their foreign 
counterparts due to early implementation.     
 
New Zealand was also one of the first OECD countries to have widespread commercial access to the 
Internet.  Academic access to NZGate began in 1989, and was extended to full commercial 
availability in 199238.  A highly competitive Internet Service Provider (ISP) market emerged and 
early adoption of dial-up access by both commercial and residential users ensued39.   At February 
2003, using Statistics NZ household and population numbers40 (as opposed to survey figures) and 
dial-up account numbers from Xtra41 extrapolated using Phoenix Research market share numbers42, 
New Zealand exhibits a dial-up penetration of 60 accounts per 100 households, or 21.4 per 100 
population at March 2003 (Figure 1).    
                                                     
35 OECD (2001a) op. cit.  p. 89. 
36 OECD.  2003a.  Communications Outlook 2003.  Paris: OECD.  p 109 
37 Alger, Dan, and Joanne Leung.  1999. The Relative Costs of Local Telephony Across Five Countries.  ISCR Research 
Paper.  http://www.iscr.org.nz/research/ 
38 Brownlee, Nevil.  1997.  Internet Pricing in Practice.  Chapter in McKnight, Lee W.; and Joseph P. Bailey (eds).  
Internet Economics.  Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
39 Enright, Christina.  2000.  Strategic Behaviour of Internet Service Providers in New Zealand.  Wellington: ISCR 
http://www.iscr.org.nz/research/ 
40 Statistics New Zealand population and household tables, http://www.statistics.govt.nz  
41 Source: Xtra  
 
 6/11/2003                                                            18 
42 Phoenix Research.  2003.   
Figure 1. Dial-Up Market 
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Figure 2. ISP Accounts 
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Moreover, when DSL accounts are added to dial-up accounts, New Zealand exhibits a low-end 
estimate of total ISP account penetration of 65 accounts per 100 households and 23 accounts per 100 
at March 2003 (Figure 2).   This compares with the latest OECD figures at December 2001, which 
shows Australia with 21.9 per 100, the United Kingdom at 22.7, the United States at 27.2 and South 
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Korea at 48.843.  New Zealand’s comparable statistic at this date was 18.5 per 100, or 14th in the 
OECD. 
 
The New Zealand dial-up access product is of very high quality compared to United States offerings, 
with an average speed of 46.3kbps compared to IBM (45.7), MCI (44.7), TDSNet (35.2) and 
WebUSA (32.8)44.   It is likely that this high quality is a consequence of New Zealand’s early 
telecommunications digitalisation programme.  This high-speed capability, combined with generous 
allocations of nodes per customer at the ISP level, ensures that the average dial-up customer receives 
a service that averages around 10kbps at peak times45.  
 
The highly competitive ISP market has ensured that New Zealand has enjoyed early innovation and 
low prices for Internet access products and services.  Rapid price reductions are catalogued in 
Enright (2000), along with New Zealand being one of the first countries (after the United States) to 
introduce unmetered ISP access packages.  Currently approximately 80% of New Zealand dial-up 
customers46 use unmetered47 packages, compared to 48% in the UK48, and the prices for these 
packages compare extremely favourably with the international benchmarks in Figure 3.  Fierce ISP 
price competition has also been fuelled by the competitive behaviours of the two 
telecommunications companies Telecom and TelstraClear, principally with the emergence and 
subsequent demise of ‘free’ ISPs49.   
 
Wide availability and low prices of New Zealand dial-up services have been sustained over an 
extended period50.   Recent developments in the market for dial-up type narrowband Internet access 
services include the introduction of SkyMail by Sky Television.   
                                                     
43 OECD (2003a) op. cit. p 137.   
44 Boardwatch Top 10 Dialup Internet Service Providers, April 2003.   
45 Based upon Xtra provisions (50% market share) - interview with Chris Thompson, May 8 2003.  
46 Based upon Xtra customers (50% of the market) as at March 2003.  
47 This paper follows the Oftel convention of pricing all packages that offer 150 hours or more per month Internet access 
for a fixed fee as ‘unmetered’.  
48 Oftel.  2003.  Internet and Broadband Brief – January 2003.  http://www.oftel.gov.uk  p 4 
49 Karel, Annemieke.  2003.  Free ISPs in New Zealand.  NZ ISCR Working Paper.   
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50 Howell, Bronwyn and Lisa Marriott. 2002.    The State of e-New Zealand: Implications for Economic Development.  
Chapter 14 in Gomez, Edmund Terence; and Robert Stephens (eds).  2003.  The State, Economic Development and Ethnic 
Co-Existence in Malaysia and New Zealand.  Kuala Lumpur: CEDER.   
Figure 3. Comparison of Residential Dial-Up Internet Access Prices – Peak 
Annual Prices in GBP, PPP as at August 2002 
Country ISP Package Connect-
ion 
Annual 
subscrip 
-tion 
usage 
for 150 
hours 
total 
ISP 
Annual 
fixed 
usage 
for 150 
hours 
total 
PSTN 
ISP+ 
PSTN 
charges 
NZ Paradise Paradise 150 0 134 0 134 0 0 0 134 
NZ Xtra Xtra Daytime 0 164 0 164 0 0 0 164 
NZ Paradise Paradise 250 0 178 0 178 0 0 0 178 
UK  Tiscali - UK  Tiscali Daytime 0 72 0 72 119 0 119 191 
UK  NTL  128k Package  17 180 0 197 0 0 0 197 
France  Noos Noosnet Forfait Primo  47 161 0 208 0 0 0 208 
US-CA  Speak Easy  56K Dial Up  0 128 0 128 100 0 100 228 
NZ Xtra Xtra ValuePack 0 230 0 134 0 0 0 230 
US-CA  Pacbell SBC  Yahoo! Dial Bundled Plan with SBC  0 137 0 164 100 0 100 236 
US-CA  AT&T  Worldnet Service Plus 0 145 0 145 100 0 100 245 
Sweden  Tele2  Tele2Internet Kabel  47 303 0 251 0 0 0 251 
US-CA  XO  Consumer Dial - Unlimited Access Plan 0 154 0 154 100 0 100 253 
Sweden  UPC  Chello  11 244 0 255 0 0 0 255 
Germany  Tiscali - de  Tiscali DSL 500  40 215 0 256 0 0 0 256 
UK  NTL  NTL:home internet service unlimited  0 120 0 120 137 0 137 257 
US-Ohio  Speak Easy  56K Dial Up  0 129 0 129 129 0 129 258 
US-CA  Qwest  Qwest DSL 256  71 188 0 259 0 0 0 259 
US-Ohio  Qwest  Qwest DSL 256  72 190 0 262 0 0 0 262 
US-Ohio  Ameritech  SBC Yahoo! Dial Bundled Plan 0 138 0 138 129 0 129 267 
UK  Telewest  Blueyonder Surfunlimited  0 144 0 144 124 0 124 268 
Germany  Prima Com _easy  19 250 0 268 0 0 0 268 
US - CA  AOL  Prepaid subscription 0 171 0 171 100 0 100 271 
US - CA  EarthLink EarthLink Unlimited Prepaid Deal  0 171 0 171 100 0 100 271 
US - CA  XO  Consumer Dial - Unlimited Access Plan 0 171 0 171 100 0 100 271 
Sweden  Telia  (Comhem) High speed internet IC 500 31 241 0 271 0 0 0 271 
Sweden  Telia  Telia Gruppenanslutning Broadband  29 245 0 274 0 0 0 274 
UK  Onetel  Unlimited hours plan 0 156 0 156 119 0 119 275 
US-Ohio  AT&T  Worldnet Service Plus 0 147 0 147 129 0 129 275 
UK  Virgin  Virgin.Net- 24seven  0 162 0 162 119 0 119 281 
Sweden  Spray  ADSL Broadband  38 244 0 282 0 0 0 282 
US-Ohio  XO  Consumer Dial - Unlimited Access Plan  0 155 0 155 129 0 129 284 
UK  Freeserve  Freeserve AnyTime  0 168 0 168 119 0 119 287 
US-CA  AT&T  WorldNet Service Unlimited 0 188 0 188 100 0 100 288 
US-CA  MSN  Dial-up Access 0 188 0 188 100 0 100 288 
US-CA  Pacbell  SBC Yahoo! Dial Service Plan 0 188 0 188 100 0 100 288 
Sweden UPC  Chello Plus 8 285 0 293 0 0 0 293 
US-CA  EarthLink  EarthLink Unlimited 6 188 0 194 100 0 100 294 
Germany  Arcor  Arcor ISDN Flat Rate 64 0 212 0 212 84 0 84 296 
Sweden  Tiscali - se  Tiscali ADSL Bredband  32 265 0 297 0 0 0 297 
Germany  Tiscali - de  Tiscali DSL time1000  40 258 0 298 0 0 0 298 
UK  Tiscali - UK  Tiscali Anytime 0 180 0 180 119 0 119 299 
US-Ohio  AOL  Prepaid subscription 0 173 0 173 129 0 129 301 
US-Ohio  EarthLink  EarthLink Unlimited Prepaid Deal 0 173 0 173 129 0 129 301 
US-Ohio  XO  Consumer Dial - Unlimited Access Plan  0 173 0 173 129 0 129 301 
US-CA  AOL  Standard Plan 0 205 0 205 100 0 100 304 
UK  BT  BT openworld Anytime 0 192 0 192 119 0 119 311 
Sweden  Telia  (Comhem) High speed internet IC 1000 31 286 0 316 0 0 0 316 
UK  NTL  512 Package 17 300 0 317 0 0 0 317 
UK  Telewest  Blueyonder Broadband Internet 17 300 0 317 0 0 0 317 
US - Ohio  Ameritech  SBC Yahoo! Dial Service Plan 0 190 0 190 129 0 129 319 
US - Ohio  AT&T  WorldNet Service Unlimited 0 190 0 190 129 0 129 319 
US - Ohio  MSN  Dial-up Access 0 190 0 190 129 0 129 319 
France  Noos  Noosnet Forfait Presto 73 246 0 319 0 0 0 319 
Germany  Arcor  Arcor DSL - Flatrate 128  6 316 0 322 0 0 0 322 
France  Wanadoo  CableWanadoo  60 263 0 322 0 0 0 322 
US - Ohio  EarthLink  EarthLink Unlimited 6 190 0 196 129 0 129 325 
Sweden  Tele2  Tele2 ADSL  33 293 0 326 0 0 0 326 
France  AOL.fr  Unmetered Service 0 212 0 212 114 0 114 326 
US-CA  EarthLink  EarthLink The Works 0 231 0 231 100 0 100 331 
US-Ohio  AOL  Standard Plan 0 207 0 207 129 0 129 335 
Sweden  Telenordia  Telenordia ADSL Bredband 36 301 0 337 0 0 0 337 
Sweden  Telia  Telia ADSL Broadband  33 306 0 340 0 0 0 340 
UK  Pipex  Pipex Xtreme Solo  59 281 0 340 0 0 0 340 
Germany  Tiscali - de  Tiscali DSL time2000  40 300 0 341 0 0 0 341 
US-CA  Qwest  DSL Deluxe  71 274 0 345 0 0 0 345 
UK  Demon  Express Solo 46 300 0 346 0 0 0 346 
US-Ohio  Qwest DSL Deluxe 72 277 0 348 0 0 0 348 
US-CA  EarthLink EarthLink High Speed Internet 0 360 0 360 0 0 0 360 
US - Ohio  EarthLink  EarthLink The Works 0 233 0 233 129 0 129 362 
US-Ohio  EarthLink  EarthLink High Speed Internet 0 363 0 363 0 0 0 363 
Germany  Arcor  Arcor DSL - Flatrate 768 6 360 0 365 0 0 0 365 
US-CA  Covad  TeleSurfer Link  47 325 0 373 0 0 0 373 
US-CA  AT&T  Broadband Internet Value Package  12 361 0 373 0 0 0 373 
US-Ohio  Covad  TeleSurfer Link 48 329 0 376 0 0 0 376 
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New Zealand residential consumers have also benefited from unmetered access to local telephony 
services via the Kiwi Share (latterly the Telecommunications Service Obligation).  Combined with 
unmetered ISP access, this offers New Zealand residential consumers unlimited access to the 
Internet while accruing no additional usage charges once fixed access prices have been paid, and is 
considered to be instrumental in engendering very high levels of utilisation of the Internet51.   
 
Oftel benchmarking for unmetered dial-up packages is based upon prices for 150 hours of dial-up 
access a month.  Figure 3 shows that three New Zealand packages offering 150 hours or more a 
month (Paradise 150 – 150 hours per month, Xtra Daytime (unlimited access except for 5pm-11pm) 
and Paradise 250 – 250 hours per month) are the cheapest in the Oftel survey.  Xtra’s unlimited 
package Xtra ValuePack price is bettered by only four products.  Indeed, the cheapest New Zealand 
product, Paradise 150, is only 70% of the price of the cheapest Oftel-benchmarked product.   
 
New Zealand’s very low dial-up prices have led to extensive use of the Internet.  New Zealand 
customers of Xtra are second after those of AOL in the United States in the number of hours per 
month spent ‘on-line’52.  Based upon total volumes of Internet traffic, as at February 2003, New 
Zealand’s 850,000 active ISP account holders consumed an average of 34.5 hours each month on-
line physically connected via the telephone network to the Internet53.  It is noted that this figure is 
actual connection time.  Perceived elapsed session times (as reported in market research surveys 
such as those of Gartner, Red Sheriff and NielsenNet) will be longer than this, as they include the 
time taken to connect and reconnect due to timing out, and processing time by the individual while 
the Internet session is timed out.   
 
As a measure of the amount of information exchanged, this shows that New Zealanders are large 
consumers of information exchange via the Internet using dial-up access.  Considerable application-
based learning has been undertaken as a result of this extensive use of dial-up connections54, and the 
maturity of the average New Zealand Internet user is confirmed by market research analysis showing 
that 69% of New Zealand users have more than 2 years Internet experience, 21% have between one 
and two years experience, and only 5% have less than 6 months experience55.   It is noted, however, 
that consistent with Howell and Obren (2002), as consumers with more marginal information 
transfer needs join the Internet, the growth in average number of hours per month per ISP account is 
                                                     
51 OECD (2000) op. cit. p 8. 
52 OECD (2001) op. cit.   
53 Derived from Telecom and Xtra data – ISCR Telecommunications database.  
54 As per Howell and Obren (2002) op. cit.  
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levelling off, and is beginning to fall, as per Figure 4.  This suggests a market that is approaching 
maturity, as the effect of mature dial-up users migrating to DSL and taking their large usage with 
them is currently small compared to the number of new dial-up users connecting (see Section 1.2 
below).    
 
Hence, there is substantial evidence reinforcing New Zealanders’ extensive use of the Internet per 
se, and hence existence of the economic and social benefits that ensue from actual usage of digital 
information exchange. 
 
Figure 4. Average New Zealand Dial-Up Internet Usage 
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55 Phoenix Research.  (2003) op.  cit. Slide 15.  
1.2 Broadband Infrastructures 
Early provision and uptake of new technologies has also been evidenced in broadband services.  
 
New Zealand became one of the first countries in the OECD to offer commercial broadband services 
when CityLink began Ethernet LAN services in 1996.  Currently, six distinct broadband platforms 
exist: 
• DSL - offered commercially by Telecom since January 1999; currently 85% of Telecom 
customers can access DSL services. 
• Ethernet LAN – introduced by CityLink in the Wellington CBD; currently servicing in 
excess of 550 connections, including nearly all of New Zealand’s Government departments, 
trading banks and insurance companies, several ISPs, schools, State-owned Enterprises, 
medical practices, a hospital, the local University and City Council, all of which are 
information transfer-intensive activities. This network was described by US commentator 
David Isenberg as one of the most impressive networks of its type in the world on his recent 
visit to Wellington56. 
• Fixed Wireless – first offered by Walker Wireless in the Auckland CBD in 2001, 
subsequently extended to include several suburban areas of Auckland, and the CBDs of 
Wellington and provincial centres Whangarei, Tauranga, Hamilton, Napier, Wanganui, 
Palmerston North, Christchurch and Dunedin, with future coverage planned in Rotorua, 
Taupo, Gisborne, New Plymouth, Hastings, Blenheim, Timaru, Queenstown and 
Invercargill; customer numbers are unknown, but the extent of current and planned regional 
coverage indicates significant investment to date and into the future 
(http://www.walkerwireless.com). 
• Cable modems – first offered by Saturn Communications (now TelstraClear) in Wellington 
in 199957, subsequently extended to some areas of Christchurch in 2001 but with investment 
suspended in 200258; predominantly a residential technology with 4500 customers in June 
200259. 
                                                     
56 November, 2002, cited in Howell and O’Connell, 2003 
57 MED.  2001.  New Zealand Telecommunications 1987-2001: New Zealand Telecommunications Information 
Publication No. 8.  Wellington: Ministry of Economic Development  Resources and Networks Branch.   p 11 
58 presumably in anticipation of an unbundling adjudication by the Telecommunications Commissioner (Rosemary 
Howard, November 29, 2002; “We believe it’s more industry efficient for TelstraClear to buy from Telecom rather than 
build duplicate networks to reach consumers who are widely spread throughout New Zealand.” 
http://www.telstraclear.co.nz/companyinfo/media_release_detail.cfm?newsid=81&news_type=tclArchive ); 
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• Interactive Satellite – provided by iHug since 1998; available nationwide; satellite download 
with dial-up upstream connection with 5000 customers in New Zealand in October 200260, 
representing approximately 8% of Telecom’s DSL customer base at the same date, and more 
than the 4500 cable modem subscribers.  
• Mobile broadband - offered by Telecom on the CDMA cellular phone network since 2002, 
with coverage over the entire Telecom Mobile network – approximately 95% of the country.  
 
New Zealand thus exhibits active facilities-based broadband platform competition, with widespread 
availability.  The best current estimate of market shares shows DSL technologies have 
approximately 90% market share and the competitors 10%.  DSL’s advantage appears to be derived 
from a combination of widespread availability, high quality service and low prices.    
 
1.2.1 Broadband Availability 
DSL is currently available to 85% of the country’s telecommunications customers.  This compares to 
2002 availabilities of 65% in the United States, 67% in the United Kingdom and 85% in Australia61.   
Satellite and mobile services are available nationwide, and wireless services in the areas identified 
above.  Cable is available in Wellington and some areas of Christchurch, whilst Ethernet LAN 
services are available in the Central Business Districts of Wellington and Auckland. 
 
It is noted that due to technical restrictions, DSL is unfeasible for service provision at locations 
further than between 5 and 7 kilometres from the local exchange. Hence, it is currently an unsuitable 
option for many rural locations in New Zealand.  Satellite, wireless and mobile telephony 
technologies provide alternatives in these locations for much of New Zealand.  ihug claims national 
availability of its Ultra Satellite product, making it the broadband product with the most widespread 
coverage although it does require access to a fixed wire telephone service for the back-feed.  Mobile 
telephony-based broadband services also have very wide coverage.  Local initiatives (e.g. Southland, 
Wairarapa, Northland) are currently proceeding with wireless provision using a consortium of 
Vodafone, Walker Wireless and BCL as a viable rural broadband access solution.   
 
Hence, there are very few areas of New Zealand where there is no broadband provision currently.  
Moreover, there is a choice of at least two platforms for most potential customers.  Mobile telephony 
and satellite services provide a choice of platforms in areas where DSL coverage is not possible.  
                                                     
60 http://www.ihug.co.nz/news/articles/151002.html 
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Satellite and DSL are available to 85% of telephony customers62.  Customers in the Wellington CBD 
have a choice of six platforms, in Auckland and Christchurch five, and in most provincial centres in 
New Zealand a choice of four platforms.  Customers in suburban Wellington and Christchurch have 
a choice of four platforms.  Such a level of platform choice is typically available only in large urban 
areas of the United States, as exhibited by the statistic that 35% of the US population cannot even 
access DSL. Extensive coverage with a variety of platforms given the low population density and 
difficult topography of the country reinforces that the high levels of spending on ICTs registered in 
New Zealand over the 1990s have translated into infrastructure investment and consequent 
widespread availability of a range of the most advanced broadband technologies available.   
 
Thus, it is difficult to conclude that there is a widespread infrastructure investment and technology 
availability problem in New Zealand that requires ‘fixing’.   This is not to minimise the fact that 
there may be some very local provision problems in certain geographical areas in respect of some 
technologies, but this challenge is not unique to New Zealand, and is generally due to the limitations 
of technology and topography making investment in specific networks in some circumstances 
uneconomic.  
 
1.2.2 Broadband Speeds 
The standard ADSL service offered to both residential and business users is a guaranteed minimum 
of 2Mbps downstream and 250kbps upstream, with a slower symmetrical package offering 128kbps 
also available for residential consumers only63.  Cable modem services offer two speeds: 256kbps 
downstream / 128kbps upstream and 2Mbps downstream/256kbps upstream64, whilst Ethernet LAN 
services are available at speeds of 10, 100 and 1000 mbps.  Mobile-based broadband services using 
CDMA technology achieve maximum speeds of 153kbps65, whilst wireless services promise speeds 
up to 3Mbps downstream and 1Mbps upstream66.  Satellite speeds are variable, with speeds over 
1Mbps readily achievable from top sites, but as “a rule of thumb, you can expect to download data 
from popular sites at around 6 - 10 times faster than a standard modem”67 – that is, around 256kbps 
to 400kbps based on New Zealand average modem service speeds.   
                                                                                                                                                                  
61 OECD (2002) op. cit.  p 32. 
62 Although it is noted that the technology currently used by iHug requires connection to a PC, and is therefore unavailable 
to users with Macintosh computers.  
63 http://www.telecom.co.nz/content/0,3900,200359-200546,00.html#20020481  
64 http://www.telstraclear.co.nz/products/internet/broadband  
65 http://www.telecom.co.nz/content/0,3900,202142-1487,00.html#20019589    
66 http://www.walkerwireless.co.nz/static/aboutthetrial.asp    
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67 http://www.getultra.co.nz/sales/speed.html  
 In international terms, the New Zealand broadband services offer comparatively very high-speed 
services for residential consumers.  Oftel benchmarking of European Union and United States 
broadband products classifies residential services as offering a minimum speed of 128kbps, but 
shows only one provider (Bostream, Sweden; 2.5Mbps upstream/750kbps downstream) as offering a 
faster residential broadband product than the standard New Zealand ADSL offering.  The majority 
of residential services offer between 512 and 1500 kbps downstream speeds68.  In respect of business 
offerings, Oftel categorises service speeds into low (minimum bandwidth 128kbps), medium 
(minimum 500kbps) and high (minimum 1000 kbps).  Clearly, most of the New Zealand services 
targeted at business users (DSL, Ethernet LAN and wireless) sit within the high-speed Oftel 
classification.  Only the mobile telephony product sits in the ‘low’ category.  Only 14 of the 50 
business products benchmarked by Oftel as “high” exceed the speed of the basic New Zealand DSL 
business offering69.   
 
Thus, New Zealand enjoys wide availability of very high-speed DSL broadband products compared 
to the European Union and the United States.   
 
1.2.3 Broadband Prices and Usage 
Benchmarking of broadband products where there is a wide variety of product quality is 
problematic.  Comparisons are also difficult when flat-rate priced products are juxtaposed with 
products charging per megabyte of traffic. Furthermore, the United States-centric nature of the 
international Internet charging processes mean that New Zealand users must pay the costs of 
transportation both of traffic requested by New Zealanders from the United States and New Zealand 
sourced content requested from the United States.  As over 85% of all Internet traffic consumed in 
New Zealand incurs this premium, benchmarking the price of transporting a specific piece of 
information worldwide is fraught with difficulty.   
 
Nonetheless, some reliable benchmarking exercises have been undertaken.  The OECD process 
weights the number of kbps per month that can be downloaded per US dollar.  By this method, New 
Zealand’s residential Jetstream packages ranked 2nd and 3rd in the OECD in 2001, within the caps 
applicable then of 400Mb and 600Mb respectively70.  The unmetered and uncapped Telecom/Xtra 
                                                     
68 Oftel (2002) op. cit. p 130 
69 Ibid p 133.  
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70 OECD 2001 op. cit. 
Jetstart product (no longer available – replaced with Jetstream Starter 5000 with a 5Gb cap) had the 
3rd lowest monthly charge in this benchmarking.   
 
The Oftel benchmarking process compares prices using a basket approach based upon market 
segment (business or residential) and product quality to rank the best-priced broadband products in 
the Sweden, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States.  Residential baskets are 
priced presuming a monthly traffic volume of 1.2Gb and a minimum bandwidth speed of 129kbps.  
Oftel’s ‘Business – Low’ presumes 6Gb monthly at minimum bandwidth 129kbps,’Business – 
Medium’ 9Gb at minimum 500kbps and ‘Business – High’ 16Gb at 1000kbps71.  Oftel 
benchmarking prices the best 70 products in each category.  Only in the ‘Business-High’ category 
are there fewer than 70 products available.  Fifty products were priced in this category in August 
2002.   
 
1.2.3.1 Residential Broadband Prices  
Inserting indicative New Zealand prices into the Oftel baskets as at August 2003 Telecom/Xtra’s 
Jetstream Starter 5000, at 18th, is among the cheaper residential products offered (Figure 5), although 
it is the slowest.  Nonetheless, it is priced significantly below the average Oftel-benchmarked price 
of ₤33.60, as are Telstra-Clear’s Cable 500 product and Telecom/Xtra Jetstream Home 500, both of 
which impose a monthly cap of 500Mb.  Telecom/Xtra Jetstream Home 1000 (1000Mb cap) is 
slightly above the average price, but when adjusted for the additional 200Mb of traffic used for the 
Oftel benchmarking, this product is comparatively expensive.   Sweden appears to offer the overall 
cheapest residential broadband packages, with 10 of the 20 cheapest products being Swedish.  Four 
in the cheapest ten are UK products, three German, two United States.  Jetstream Starter 5000 is 
cheaper than the cheapest French residential package.  It is noted that the majority of United States 
and UK DSL products, including those offered by incumbent telecommunications companies such as 
BT, AT&T, Verizon, Pacbell, Southwestern and Ameritech, are significantly (10%-55%) more 
expensive than the cheapest New Zealand products, with the Pacbell, Southwestern and Ameritech 
products all being more expensive than Jestream Home 1000. 
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Figure 5. Modified Oftel Benchmarking: Broadband Residential 
Rank Country ISP Package DSL/Cable 
Modem 
Total 
Monthly  
Charges 
Downstream 
capacity 
1.  Sweden Tele2 Tele2Internet Kabel  CM 21 512 
2.  Sweden UPC Chello  CM 21 512 
3.  US Qwest Qwest DSL 256  DSL 22 256 
4.  Sweden Telia  (Comhem) High speed internet IC 500  CM 22 512 
5.  Germany PrimaCom _easy  CM 22 256 
6.  Sweden Spray ADSL Broadband  DSL 23 512 
7.  Sweden UPC Chello Plus  CM 24 768 
8.  Sweden Tiscali Tiscali ADSL Bredband  DSL 24 512 
9.  Sweden Telia  (Comhem) High speed internet IC 1000  CM 26 1000 
10.  UK NTL 512 Package  CM 26 512 
11.  UK Telewest Blueyonder Broadband Internet  CM 26 512 
12.  Sweden Tele2 Tele2 ADSL  DSL 27 512 
13.  Sweden Telenordia Telenordia ADSL Bredband  DSL 28 512 
14.  Sweden Telia Telia ADSL Broadband  DSL 28 512 
15.  UK Pipex Pipex Xtreme Solo  DSL 28 512 
16.  Germany Tiscali - de Tiscali DSL time2000  DSL 28 768 
17.  Germany Tiscali - de Tiscali DSL time1000  DSL 28 768 
18.  NZ Telecom-Xtra Jetstream Starter 5000 (5000Mb per month) DSL 29 128 
19.  UK Demon Express Solo  DSL 29 512 
20.  US Qwest DSL Deluxe  DSL 29 640 
21.  France Wanadoo CableWanadoo  CM 30 512 
22.  Germany Arcor Arcor DSL - Flatrate 768  DSL 30 768 
23.  NZ TelstraClear Cable 500 (500 Mb per month) DSL 30 256 
24.  NZ Telecom-Xtra Jetstream Home 500 (500Mb per month) DSL 31 2000 
25.  US EarthLink EarthLink High Speed Internet  CM 31 1500  * 
26.  Germany Arcor Arcor-DSL flatrate 768  DSL 31 768 
27.  France Noos Noosnet Forfait Rapido  CM 31 512 
28.  US Covad TeleSurfer Link  DSL 32 200 
29.  US AT&T Broadband Internet Value Package  CM 32 1440 
30.  Germany AOL .de AOL High Speed DSL Flat (12months)  DSL 32 768 
31.  UK BT Home 500 Plug & Go  DSL 32 500 
32.  Germany PrimaCom _pro  CM 33 1024 
33.  US Comcast High Speed Internet Service  CM 33 1500  * 
34.  UK Onetel Unplugged 500  DSL 34 512 
35.  Germany Tiscali - de Tiscali DSL 500  DSL 34 768 
36.  UK Freeserve Connection-only pack  DSL 34 512 
37.  UK Freeserve Freeserve Broadband  DSL 34 512 
38.  OFTEL  OFTEL Average  34.60  
39.  UK Pipex Pipex Xtreme Home Office Std - Self  DSL 35 512 
40.  US AT&T Broadband Cable Internet Service  CM 35 1440 
41.  France Club Internet Pack Modem Haut Debit  DSL 35 512 
42.  France 9 Telecom 9Online ADSL 512  DSL 35 512 
43.  UK Zen Internet ZenADSL Home  DSL 35 512 
44.  UK Tiscali - UK Tiscali ADSL USB 500  DSL 35 500 
45.  US Road Runner Residential Service  CM 35 1500  * 
46.  France Wanadoo Wanadoo ADSL (Xtense500)  DSL 35 512 
47.  US MSN DSL  DSL 35 768 
48.  US Qwest MSN Broadband Powered by Qwest 256  DSL 35 256 
49.  Germany AOL .de AOL High Speed DSL Flat  DSL 35 1500  * 
50.  Germany T-Online T-Online DSL Flat  DSL 35 768 
51.  France AOL .fr AOL ADSL  DSL 36 512 
52.  France Tiscali .fr Pack ADSL Tiscali Liberty Surf  DSL 36 512 
53.  Sweden Bostream ADSL Private  DSL 36 2500  * 
54.  UK Onetel Hard wired 500U  DSL 36 512 
55.  US Verizon Online DSL Package 1 (Was Online DSL  DSL 37 768 
56.  UK BT Home 500 Engineer assisted  DSL 37 768 
57.  UK Demon  Express DSL 37 512 
58.  Germany Tiscali - de Tiscali DSL time100  DSL 38 768 
59.  NZ Telecom-Xtra Jetstream Home 1000 (1000Mb per month) DSL 39 2000 
60.  US Southwestern Basic DSL Internet Service up to 1500  DSL 40 1500  * 
61.  US Pacbell Basic DSL Internet Service up to 1500  DSL 40 1500  * 
62.  US Ameritech - SpeedPath 768  DSL 40 768 
63.  US AOL .us High Speed DSL  DSL 40 1472 
64.  US Covad TeleSurfer  DSL 41 608 
65.  France Nerim Nerim Base  DSL 41 512 
66.  France Club Internet Forfait Haut Debit ( Net 1)  DSL 41 512 
67.  Germany NGI NGI DSL Student  DSL 42 1024 
68.  France Wanadoo Wanadoo ADSL 1  DSL 42 500 
69.  US Qwest MSN Broadband Powered by Qwest  DSL 43 640 
70.  US EarthLink EarthLink DSL  DSL 43 1500  * 
71.  UK Telewest 1MB Internet  DSL 43 1024 
72.  US Verizon Online DSL Package 2 (Was Online DSL  DSL 44 1500  * 
73.  Germany NGI NGI DSL Flat  DSL 44 1024 
74.  US AT&T Single User ADSL - 608/128  DSL 45 608 
75.  Germany QSC Q-DSL Home  DSL 45 1024 
76.  NZ Telecom-Xtra Jetstream1000 adjusted to 1200Mb DSL 57 2000 
All prices are calculated at PPP in UK£ based on tariffs valid at August 2002       * Denotes product of comparable quality to Jetstream 
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When comparing residential Jetstream packages in the Oftel tables, it is stressed that the Jetstream 
product is the second best quality product ranked.  Of the seventy cheapest residential products 
benchmarked, only Sweden’s Bostream ADSL Private 2500kbps service is of higher quality.  The 
next fastest residential products benchmarked are 1500kbps.  This does not mean very high speed 
residential products are not offered in the markets considered – rather, it identifies that only one 
product of equal or higher quality than the Telecom product is among the cheapest 70 residential 
products in the five markets considered.  At a monthly exchange volume of 1.2Gb, the combined 
fixed 1000Mb charge plus the additional usage of 200 Mb for Jetstream Home 1000 is priced at ₤57, 
nearly 60% more expensive than the 52nd-ranked Swedish Bostream product.  However, for 
customers who remain within the 1000Mb cap, Jetstream Home 1000 is only marginally (8%) dearer 
than the unmetered Swedish product.   
 
Thus, within limits of use, the New Zealand product compares very favourably with the only product 
of greater quality registered in the Oftel benchmarking survey.  Indeed, of all the other products 
ranking ahead of Jetstream Home 1000, only five (Earthlink – USA, 24th; Comcast – USA, 32nd; 
Roadrunner – USA, 43rd); .de AOL – Germany, 47th; and Bostream) have speeds of 1500kbps or 
higher, and all are more expensive than Jetstream Home 500.  Moreover, only .de AOL and 
Bostream are DSL products (both of these are more expensive than the OECD average) – the others 
are all cable products.   
 
It is also noted that of the seventy residential products benchmarked by Oftel, only two (Germany’s 
Tiscali DSL 500 and Tiscali Time 100 – both 768kbps products) are not sold as flat-rate unmetered 
packages.  Per megabyte charging is undertaken in New Zealand due to the high costs of 
transporting data from its origin to New Zealand.  Xtra figures72 show that over 85% of Internet data 
consumed in New Zealand originates in the United States.  The costs of transporting this data via the 
Southern Cross Cable are significantly greater than the costs experienced by United States 
consumers accessing the same data in the United States.  Furthermore, due to Internet 
interconnection charging practices, New Zealand data transporters are unable to recover the cost of 
data transport provided by New Zealand servers to the United States or other foreign jurisdictions.  
New Zealand prices must include a component to cover this additional cost.  Hence, the data transfer 
charges faced by New Zealanders are significantly greater than the prices faced by consumers in 
other countries who source their information predominantly from within their own country or 
common economic zone (European Union).  The New Zealand charging practice has arisen partially 
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in an endeavour to ensure that consumers of international traffic pay the real costs that their 
information consumption incurs.  Indeed, Paradise charges for additional traffic at two separate rates 
– 2c/Mb for national traffic, 20c/Mb for international traffic – in order to send the appropriate price 
signals to consumers with respect to these additional costs.  This charging practice undoubtedly 
accounts for the higher price of the Jetstream Home 1000 package adjusted to match the 1.2Gb 
benchmark of the Oftel survey.  Thus, New Zealand residential broadband prices are similar to US 
and European Union products of comparable quality, despite the data transfer cost disadvantage 
of having to pay for large volumes of data transmission from the United States via the Southern 
Cross Cable.   
 
1.2.3.2 Residential Broadband Usage 
Availability, price and connection data alone tell only part of the story of intersection of supply and 
demand.  In order to determine the real prices that New Zealand consumers are actually paying 
relative to their counterparts in the Oftel survey, it is necessary to consider the volumes of data 
actually transported. Xtra’s Jetstream Starter 5000 provides the most generous Mb allowance of the 
New Zealand products benchmarked, at 5Gb a month.  Paradise offers a similar product with a 10Gb 
cap.  However, data from Xtra shows that even when there is a high unmetered data transfer 
allowance within the monthly fee, the volume of information actually transferred per Jetstream 
Starter account is very small.  Figure 6 shows that more than 60% of the customers of this product 
actually consumed less than 1000Mb in the typical month examined.  Eighty percent of these 
customers consume less than 2000Mb.  Indeed, only 5% consumed more than the 5Gb allowed 
(0.3% consumed more than 10Gb).  Average consumption per customer is 1500Mb per month, yet 
the median is only 700 Mb.  Likewise, the average consumption per customer of Xtra’s Jetstream 
Home 500 is 400Mb (median 200Mb) and Xtra’s Jetstream Home 1000 800Mb (median 600Mb).  
These are the ‘Extreme Users’ of Figure 7, whose data exchange comprises predominantly peer-to-
peer file exchange, file downloading and significant browsing such as required to support interactive 
gaming.  The vast majority of residential usage is for low volume email and browsing73 (Figure 8).  
Thus, the consumption of a few conspicuously heavy consumers masks the very low usage of the 
majority of broadband subscribers. 
 
                                                     
73 Anderson, Ben; Caroline Gale; Mary Jones and Annabel McWilliam.  Domesticating Broadband – what consumers 
really do with flat-rate, always on and fast Internet access.  BT Technology Journal 20(1), 2002, 103-114. 
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Figure 6. Residential Broadband Usage – February 2003 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%
Percent of Subscriber Base
M
on
th
ly
 U
sa
ge
 M
b
Jetstream 500 Jetstream 1000 JetStart 5000
 
 
Figure 7. Current Average Usage by Segment – Feb 2003 
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The key inference drawn from these figures is that even those New Zealand residential users with 
access to generous downloading allowances actually consume comparatively small volumes of 
data.  Per megabyte charging is therefore a disincentive only to a small number of very intensive 
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residential users, whom it can be argued should not be expecting the vast majority of much lower-
using consumers to subsidise their extensive usage via flat-rate plans74, especially when the majority 
of the data transfer that they consume is across the costly Southern Cross Cable.   For the vast 
majority of residential broadband users, at the low levels of individual consumption exhibited in this 
analysis for both large allowance and small allowance broadband plans, the prices of both the 
slower Jetstream Starter product and the higher-speed Jetstream Home products compare very 
favourably with similar products in the Oftel survey. 
 
Figure 8. Sample Month Residential Broadband Traffic 
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1.2.3.3 Business Broadband Prices  
The same issues of product quality and levels of usage as discussed for residential consumers also 
apply to the products offered to New Zealand business broadband consumers. 
 
Given the very high quality of the New Zealand DSL product, the only relevant business product 
comparison that can be made using the Oftel data is in the Business – High category.  To estimate 
the charges for the benchmarked 16Gb, two approaches can be taken:  
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• Using the price for Xtra’s Jetstream 10000 business package and adding the usage charge 
for the additional 6 Gb; or 
• Using the price for Xtra’s Jetstream 20000 and recognising that it offers a higher volume of 
data downloading than the benchmarked products.   
The lowest price is yielded by the first option.  This is displayed along with the PPP-converted 
prices for each of the Xtra business products  (Jetstream 600, Jetstream 1200, Jetstream 1800; 
Jetstream 3000; Jetstream 5000; Jetstream 10000 and Jetstream 20000, with monthly caps of 0.6, 
1.2, 1.8, 3, 5, 10 and 20 Gb respectively) in Figure 9.    
 
The New Zealand product priced at 16Gb per month ranks towards the end of the Oftel list, at a 
price (₤685) slightly higher than the Oftel average (₤511).   For high volume, fast broadband the 
United States clearly offers the best prices, with 23 out of the cheapest 24 products being offered by 
United States providers.  It is also noted that all of the United States products, and the solitary 
Swedish product (3rd) in this group, are offered in unmetered packages.  The next 13 positions (25th 
to 37th) are occupied by German products. The United States’ Covad product sits at 38th, followed by 
another 14 German products.  New Zealand’s adjusted Jetstream 10000 plus 6000Mb product sits in 
the middle of these German products.   Of the German products sitting above Jetstream, eight are 
metered and ten unmetered.  Only Germany offers metered business broadband products at this 
quality level in the Oftel survey.  It does not appear that any business product offered in the UK 
reaches the quality described as High in the Oftel definition, and only one product of this type is 
provided in the Swedish market.   
 
As per the Oftel basket, New Zealand’s business Jetstream product is priced on a par with those 
available in Germany, the European Union’s strongest advocate and most active practitioner of 
LLU.  Like New Zealand, Germany offers metered business products.  Whilst United States business 
prices are undoubtedly cheaper per month, when service quality is factored in, only seven of the 
cheaper business packages (three US, four German) offer downstream speeds better than those of 
Jetstream.  New Zealand business DSL prices are less than half those charged in France, whilst the 
solitary French product of comparable quality is nearly three times the price of the New Zealand 
product.    
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Figure 9. Modified Oftel Benchmarking: Broadband Business – High  
Ra
nk 
Country ISP Package DSL/Cable 
Modem 
Total 
Monthly 
Charges 
Downstream 
capacity 
1. NZ Telecom-Xtra Jetstream 600 DSL 35 2000 
2. NZ Telecom-Xtra Jetstream 1200 DSL 61 2000 
3. US Qwest DSL Pro, 1M  DSL 66 1000 
4. US Speak Easy NetCommuter ADSL 1.5/768  DSL 77 1500 
5. NZ Telecom-Xtra Jetstream 1800 DSL 87 2000 
6. Sweden Telia Telia Bredband Foretag -2.0 Mbits  DSL 116 2000 
7. US Qwest DSL Pro, 4M  DSL 118 4000  * 
8. NZ Telecom-Xtra Jetstream 3000 DSL 139 2000 
9. US Speak Easy NetCommuter 1100K  DSL 164 1100 
10. US XO Business DSL 1.1Mbps  DSL 181 1100 
11. US Speak Easy NetCommuter 1500K  DSL 181 1500 
12. US Qwest DSL Pro, 7M  DSL 193 7000  * 
13. US Speak Easy Multi-Office 1100K  DSL 198 1100 
14. US Southwestern Bell Symmetric DSL Internet 1100K  DSL 202 1100 
15. NZ Telecom-Xtra Jetstream 5000 DSL 213 2000 
16. US Covad Telespeed 1.1  DSL 215 1100 
17. US XO Business DSL 1.5Mbps  DSL 215 1500 
18. US Speak Easy Net Advantage 1100K  DSL 215 1100 
19. US Speak Easy Net Advantage Plus 1100K  DSL 229 1100 
20. US AT&T Multi User SDSL - 1100/1100  DSL 247 1100 
21. US XO Business DSL 2.3Mbps  DSL 249 2300  * 
22. US Speak Easy Multi-Office 1500K  DSL 249 1500 
23. US EarthLink Earthlink Biz DSL 1.1 Mbps  DSL 249 1100 
24. US Southwestern Bell Symmetric DSL Internet 1500K  DSL 250 1500 
25. US Covad Telespeed 1.5  DSL 262 1500 
26. US AT&T Multi User SDSL - 1500/1500  DSL 281 1500 
27. US Speak Easy Net Advantage 1500K  DSL 283 1500 
28. US Speak Easy Net Advantage Plus 1500K  DSL 283 1500 
29. US EarthLink Earthlink Biz DSL 1.5 Mbps  DSL 283 1500 
30. Germany Claranet sDSL 1024  DSL 288 1024 
31. Germany KKF Professional DSL Volume 1000K  DSL 356 1000 
32. Germany KKF Professional DSL Volume 1500K  DSL 374 1500 
33. NZ Telecom-Xtra Jetstream 10000 DSL 405 2000 
34. Germany KKF Professional DSL Volume 2000K  DSL 410 2000 
35. Germany NGI NGI SDSL 1000 Volume Rate  DSL 421 1000 
36. Germany KKF Professional DSL Flatrate 1000K  DSL 427 1000 
37. Germany NGI NGI SDSL 1000 Flat Rate  DSL 439 1000 
38. Germany NGI NGI SDSL 1500 Volume Rate  DSL 441 1500 
39. Germany Claranet sDSL 2300 small business  DSL 443 2300  * 
40. Germany WorldCom Worldcom Internet DSL Office DSL 469 1024 
41. Germany QSC DSL Business 10  DSL 471 1024 
42. Germany NGI NGI SDSL 2000 Volume Rate  DSL 477 2000 
43. OFTEL  Oftel average  511  
44. Germany KKF Professional DSL Flatrate 1500K  DSL 519 1500 
45. US Covad TeleXtend 1500  DSL 533 1500 
46. Germany NGI NGI SDSL 1500 Flat Rate  DSL 535 1500 
47. Germany Claranet sDSL2300  DSL 535 2300  * 
48. Germany KKF Professional DSL Flatrate 2000K  DSL 555 2000 
49. Germany NGI NGI SDSL 2000 Flat Rate  DSL 570 2000 
50. Germany QSC DSL Business 20  DSL 601 2300  * 
51. Germany WorldCom Worldcom Internet DSL Office2300 DSL 610 2300  * 
52. Germany Arcor Arcor Internet Business Flatrate2300/2300 DSL 638 2300  * 
53. NZ Telecom-Xtra Jetstream (10000 + 6000Mb) DSL 685 2000 
54. NZ Telecom-Xtra Jetstream 20000 DSL 724 2000 
55. Germany T-Online T-Interconnect Basic 1.92Mbit/s  DSL 858 1920 
56. Germany T-Online Interconnect 3 - volume rate  DSL 867 4096  * 
57. Germany Arcor Arcor Internet Business Flatrate385/4000 DSL 915 4000  * 
58. Germany T-Online Interconnect 4 - volume rate  DSL 973 6016  * 
59. Germany T-Online Interconnect 3 - flat rate  DSL 1073 4096  * 
60. Germany KKF Professional DSL Flatrate 4000K  DSL 1078 4000  * 
61. Germany NGI NGI SDSL 4000 Flat Rate  DSL 1095 4000  * 
62. France Nerim Nerim HDSL 1024 Kbits  DSL 1314 1024 
63. France Nerim Nerim HDSL 1536 Kbits  DSL 1530 1536 
64. France Nerim Nerim HDSL 2084 Kbits  DSL 1746 2048  * 
65. Germany T-Online Interconnect 4 - flat rate  DSL 2063 6016  * 
All prices are calculated at PPP in UK£ based on tariffs valid at August 2002   * Denotes faster product than Jetstream 
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1.2.3.4 Business Broadband Usage 
When adjusting for levels of usage, however, the New Zealand business packages are very 
competitive.  The prices for low-volume users (less than 5Gb a month) rank amongst the cheapest 
United States products.  Indeed, even the New Zealand 10Gb product ranks in the middle of the 
table, at a price less than the Oftel average. The New Zealand pricing structures mean that 
businesses that do not require large volumes of data exchange, or consume comparatively less 
expensive New Zealand data rather than costly United States data, are not penalised by having to 
subsidise heavier users via flat-rate un metered packages.   
 
If the distribution of New Zealand business Internet usage mirrors that of residential usage, then 
there is probably a very large number of very low-using businesses, and only a few very high-using 
ones.  Moreover, business usage may not be as extensive in terms of total megabytes transferred per 
customer as residential usage.  Anecdotal evidence from Xtra and survey data support the contention 
that New Zealand business broadband subscribers are on average consuming only small volumes of 
data exchange.  Xtra reports that broadband consumption during traditional business hours (daytime) 
is very much less than in the evenings, which are dominated by residential usage.  Furthermore, 
most surveys of business use of the Internet in New Zealand75 cite email and web browsing as the 
predominant business Internet applications.  These low-volume, unstructured applications are the 
ones most suited to New Zealand’s small businesses, which the OECD deems are most likely to 
benefit from broadband access to the Internet76.  It is presumed that larger businesses with significant 
data transfer requirements would be using dedicated transfer mechanisms such as leased T-1 lines or 
Ethernet LAN services where these are available, rather than DSL.   
 
Thus, it can be concluded that New Zealand business broadband prices compare very favourably, 
ranking amongst the lowest of the United States prices in the Oftel survey for observed patterns of 
usage.  It is only when businesses require very large quantities of data from overseas that the New 
Zealand product becomes less competitive.  In addition to accounting for the differences in cost 
associated with moving international traffic to New Zealand, the flexibility of the New Zealand 
pricing structure recognises that a ‘one size suits all’ pricing package is not necessarily appropriate 
for businesses of varying information transfer requirements.  This level of pricing flexibility may be 
a factor contributing to New Zealand’s comparatively high levels of broadband uptake noted 
                                                     
75 For example, Statistics New Zealand.  2002. Information Technology Use in New Zealand: 2001.  Wellington, New 
Zealand: Statistics New Zealand; Clark et al. (2002),  op. cit.    
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76 OECD (2002) op. cit. p5; Howell and Obren (2002) op. cit.  
amongst the small business sector comparative to other countries such as the UK (Section 1.3 
below).  
1.3 Summary: OECD-Leading Internet Connectivity, Uptake 
Given the very favourable supply-side factors of wide and early availability of Internet technologies, 
low prices for dial-up products, low prices for low levels of broadband usage, and prices comparable 
with the best of the United States and the European Union for equivalent quality broadband 
products, high product quality of both dial-up and broadband,and many of the other policy and 
environmental factors deemed helpful in promoting information exchange on the Internet, it is not 
surprising to find that New Zealand enjoys some of the best connectivity and utilisation measures in 
the OECD. 
 
Figure 10 summarises New Zealand’s relative position to benchmark OECD countries in a variety of 
metrics77: 
Connectivity: 
• ISP accounts per 100 population, measuring the extent of penetration of the Internet 
generally 
• Households with access to the Internet, indicating relative availability and recreational use 
of the Internet 
• PC access to the Internet in schools, providing evidence of educational utilisation of the 
Internet 
• Internet Hosts per 1000 inhabitants, a measure of domain name linked computers connected 
to the Internet, and hence a measure of specifically business connectivity to the Internet 
• Web sites per 1000 inhabitants, providing an indication of the extent of (particularly 
business) content being created in each location 
• Domain names per 1000, as a measure of both business and residential ‘presence’ and 
indicating the extend to which individuals and business are creating content for the Internet 
• Secure servers per million inhabitants, measuring the extent to which Internet connectivity is 
being utilised for secure transactions 
 
 
Broadband Statistics 
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77 The metrics in figure 11 are taken from the current OECD Telecommunications Database http://www.sourceoecd.org 
unless otherwise indicated.  
• Broadband subscribers per 1000 population 
• DSL subscribers per 1000 population 
 
Uptake 
• Minutes of use per ISP account per month, as a proxy for the relative amounts of 
information being exchanged via dial-up Internet accounts 
 
Figure 10 shows that New Zealand sits within the top 10 countries of the OECD for the vast majority 
of these connection and utilisation statistics.  In particular, it lies ahead of near neighbour Australia 
in all except the broadband statistics.  Comparisons with the United Kingdom also show New 
Zealand to be performing well, with the exception of content creation.  Whilst the United States 
clearly shows higher rankings than New Zealand, this is not surprising given that most innovation 
with respect to Internet technologies and the applications that make use of the capabilities of the new 
technologies is occurring in that market.  What does appear surprising is the relatively large amount 
of content that is being created in New Zealand, given that around 85% of Internet traffic 
‘consumed’ in New Zealand emanates from the United States.  The significance of this statistic is 
that it is business content creation that sits favourably against OECD benchmarks.  This is a strong 
indication that New Zealand’s extensive use of Internet connectivity is being used within the 
business sector for productivity gains relative to other countries. 
 
New Zealand’s DSL penetration per head of population is very close to that of the United States 
(Figure 10).  Despite extensive LLU activity in the United States, New Zealand has achieved both a 
much higher level of DSL coverage and a level of DSL connectivity (Figure 10) and pricing 
(Figures 5, 9) that is very nearly the same.  This reinforces that residentially focussed cable 
infrastructure is the leading determinant of the United States’ overall 4th ranking in OECD 
broadband penetration.  New Zealand’s DSL penetration is also significantly in advance of that of 
Australia, the UK and France.  In each of these cases, as with the US, higher overall broadband 
penetration relies upon the extent of cable subscriptions.  As residential DSL pricing is not 
significantly different from others in the modified Oftel benchmarking (cheaper for some products), 
cable is predominantly a residential application, and New Zealand does not have a significant cable 
offering, then absence of a cable product appears to be the single factor distinguishing the New 
Zealand residential market from its counterparts.  This implies that something associated with the 
cable product may be relevant in explaining the apparently poor broadband uptake statistic.  
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Figure 10. Relative OECD Internet Connectivity and Uptake Rankings 
New 
Zealand 
Australia USA South Korea UK France Internet Metric 
# Rank # Rank # Rank # Rank # Rank # Rank 
Connectivity Statistics 
ISP Accounts/100 14 9th 12 10th  18  5th  23 1st =  11 12th  5 21st  
Household % 48 5th 47 8th  50 3rd  - - 38 10th  12 23rd  
School Availability 22 4th  17 5th  27 2nd  5 19th  16 9th  6 18th  
Internet Hosts/1000 10
5 
8th  95 10th 272 1st  14 26th  63 13th  31 19th  
Web Sites/1000 11 12th  9 13th  47 1st  6 17th  25 4th 4 20th  
Domain Names/1000 22 11th  19 16th  38 5th  21 14th  51 1st 9 
Secure Servers/million 20
2 
3rd  19
0 
5th  301 2nd  11 28th  141 8th  38 21st  
Broadband Statistics 
BB Subscr/100078 7 19th  9 17h  47 4th  173  1st 6 20th  11 15th  
DSL Subscr/100079 14 15th  8 20th  15 14th  130 1st  7 21st  12 17th  
DSL Coverage %  85  85   65  90  66  91 
Uptake Statistics 
21 2nd 18 4th 26 1st - - 10 7th = 10 7th = Hours/month/ISP 
account (Xtra) (Telstra) (AOL)  (All ISPs) (All ISPs) 
20th  
 
The comparison between New Zealand and South Korea is especially interesting.  Whilst South 
Korea leads the OECD in the number of individuals connecting to the Internet (ISP accounts per 
1000 and broadband connections per 1000), it lies in the lower half of the OECD in respect of 
business utilisation and content creation statistics.  Indeed, it can be argued that South Korea’s 
strong broadband uptake is predicated almost solely on recreational residential consumption of 
interactive gaming and English language video content due to the absence of enforcement of 
copyright  (see Appendix 2).   
 
Thus, New Zealanders can be classified as world-leading users of Internet technologies, and there is 
considerable consistency in the extent of this leadership across sectoral divisions (business, 
residential, educational).  This suggests that usage of the Internet and the information that its 
exchange enables, is widespread.  This is in contrast to South Korea, which leads in individual 
connectivity statistics, but lies in the lower half of the OECD in respect of business usage statistics, 
suggesting a distinct skew in the types of Internet usage, and hence information exchange, that is 
occurring in that country.  Whilst accrual of benefits and consequently the performance implications 
in New Zealand would appear to cover most sectors of the economy, the accrual of the benefits of 
                                                     
78 September 2002  http://www.oecd.org/EN/document/0,,EN-document-41-1-no-4-39262-41,00.html 
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79 September 2002 
information transport in South Korea appear to be largely confined to the residential sector.  These 
benefits will not necessarily translate into measurable productivity improvements as the increases in 
utility gained by a consumer substituting one form of entertainment consumption spending for 
another within household entertainment budgets go largely unmeasured in aggregate national 
statistics, as the same amount of consumption spending is recorded as long as the budget stays 
constant.  The spending is merely transferred between sectors80.  High broadband connectivity per se 
in South Korea is thus not necessarily an indicator of increasing measurable productivity 
enhancements. 
 
2. The Dilemma: NZ Exhibits Dismal Broad Band Penetration by OECD 
Standards  
It is only when broadband connectivity statistics are added to the table that New Zealand shows 
evidence of slipping to the rear of the OECD tables.    In terms of the consistency argument 
advanced in Appendix 1, only one statistic in respect of New Zealand’s overall electronic 
information transportation and utilisation environment stands out as being inconsistent.  But does 
this really matter, if it is actually information exchange via the Internet that generates productivity 
gains? 
 
The single inconsistency in broadband penetration poses an interesting dilemma: New Zealanders 
show very high levels of Internet usage relative to the rest of the OECD, yet have very poor 
broadband connectivity.   Why, despite the multiple advantages of: 
• early entry into the broadband market; 
• early provision of telephony-based DSL services; 
• multiple competitive broadband technology platforms; 
• low prices by world standards (despite the double disadvantage of price penalties due to an 
overwhelming percentage of content consumed emanating from the United States); 
• high levels of broadband availability and coverage;  
• a history of significant use of information content exchanged over the Internet; and 
• multi-sectoral use of the technology;  
have the majority of  New Zealand Internet users eschewed the opportunities to purchase broadband 
connections?  As there appears to be no significant supply-side bottleneck, then the remaining 
solution is that there are impediments to uptake on the demand side. 
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80 Triplett, Jack E.; and Barry P. Bosworth. 2000. Productivity in the Services Sector.  Washington: Brookings Institution.   
Explaining the Dilemma 
Howell and Obren’s 81 substitution-based model uses the application base, the value of user time and 
information transfer technology costs to analyse the point at which a given user will substitute 
broadband technologies for dial-up.  They conclude that in the presence of flat-rate pricing for both 
dial-up and broadband technologies, the only factors that induce earlier substitution are: 
• high fixed costs of dial-up relative to broadband; 
• broadband that is significantly faster than dial-up; 
• a high user valuation of time; and  
• the number of information exchanges that the user undertakes.   
When there is a usage charge for both dial-up and broadband, in addition to the other factors, 
substitution is less likely to occur if the per-megabyte charge for broadband is high relative to the 
per-minute charge for dial-up. 
 
As there is no evidence of either a significant supply side bottleneck or a low number of Internet 
information exchanges occurring in the New Zealand Internet market, then it is most likely that the 
explanation for the observed dilemma will be found in analysing factors such as the relative prices of 
the technologies influencing the point at which the substitution from dial-up to broadband is made, 
including pricing, any significant market segment differences, and the application base that underlies 
demand for Internet information exchange.  
 
1. Pricing Arbitrage 
It is widely acknowledged that the relative pricing of broadband compared to dial-up is a key factor 
influencing the point at which substitution will occur82.  If the broadband infrastructure is offered at 
prices that are very low compared to dial-up, then substitution will be induced not because of any of 
the intrinsic technical capabilities and qualities of broadband (e.g. transmission speed, capacity), but 
simply because pricing mechanisms render it comparatively less costly.  If the real costs of 
providing broadband are less than those of providing the existing platform, then this is efficiency-
raising and will lead to genuine productivity gains.  However, these gains are transitory.   Given a 
standard application set, total usage of the technology will increase only to the extent of that induced 
by the lower prices, and eventually settle at a new level.  Pricing arbitrage merely brings forward the 
                                                     
81 Howell and Obren (2002) op. cit 
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82 Howell and Obren (2002) op. cit;  Oftel (2002) op. cit.  
point at which the technology substitution will occur83.  Whilst short-term productivity benefits 
accrue from productivity improvements associated with existing applications, these are capped.   
Additional productivity enhancements still depend upon the development of additional usage over 
and above that induced simply by lower prices.  
 
Figure 11 shows the comparative prices based upon Oftel benchmarking84.  Despite New Zealand’s 
internationally low prices for both dial-up and broadband within the currently observed levels, there 
is still a significant price disadvantage for broadband compared to other countries.  Residential 
consumers face ratios greater than those of the US and the UK. However, this is not because New 
Zealand broadband is expensive, but because residential dial-up is so very cheap, given low ISP 
costs and no charging for local call access.   
 
However, when comparing the costs facing businesses, the New Zealand ratios are significantly 
lower, due to the per-minute charging for local calls. For larger volume users, the difference is 
considerable, with Jetstream5000 being 20% less expensive than a 200 hour dial-up package.  It is 
noted that the New Zealand business ratios are also less than the comparable ones for the UK and the 
US. 
 
Figure 11. Modified Oftel Comparison: Broadband and Dial-up Costs.    
Residential Business  
Broadband Dial-Up 
(150 hours) 
Ratio Broadband Dial-Up 
(150 hours) 
Ratio 
France 367 793 0.46 850 1460 0.58 
Germany 305 537 0.57 510 1110 0.46 
Sweden 250 805 0.31 430 1281 0.34 
UK 317 224 1.42 370 332 1.12 
US 317 247 1.28 442 328 1.35 
NZ (1)85 348 134 2.59 420 353 1.19 
NZ (2)86 348 230 1.51 213 263 0.81 
Prices in UK₤, PPP at August 2002 
 
Hence, purely as a consequence of access pricing arbitrage, Figure 11 implies we would expect to 
see a much earlier substitution to broadband by businesses than residential consumers.   
 
                                                     
83 Howell and Obren (2002) op cit.   
84 Oftel (2002) op. cit. p 69-70 
85 Jetstream Starter 5000 and Paradise 150; Jetstream 600 and Xtra Prepay20 
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86 Jetstream Starter 5000 and Xtra ValuePack; Jetstream 5000 and Xtra Prepay200 
2. Usage Levels and User Value of Time 
It is noted, however, that whilst Figure 11 incorporates trade-offs between minutes of dial-up use 
and megabytes of broadband traffic, these are not the sole price factors influencing the substitution 
decision.  Usage levels and the user value of time must also be considered.   
 
Marketing of both residential and business broadband has emphasised the superior speed of the 
broadband product in order to induce purchase.  This factor is especially relevant given the very high 
speed offering of the standard New Zealand DSL product.  Depending upon the users’ value of time, 
then in addition to any incentives offered by pricing arbitrage, if time savings from faster 
transmission exceed additional costs, substitution will occur.   Substitution in New Zealand may 
therefore be delayed relative to other countries if user valuations of time are comparatively low.  
 
Whilst low user time valuations may be depressing residential substitution in respect of unmetered 
products, usage charges are considered to be a significant factor in the business market and the 
metered residential market.   
 
The credibility of usage charges as an inhibitor in the business market is weak, however, given the 
variety of usage packages (0.5, 1.2, 1.8, 3, 5,10, and 20 Gb per month) offering choices from which 
customers can select.  Careful selection of the appropriate package from within these bands results in 
low users facing substantially lower charges than their US and European counterparts.  Furthermore, 
usage charges are not sufficient to explain the purchase behaviours of the vast majority of residential 
users whose monthly data transfer requirement does not exceed 1Gb.  Moreover, neither does it 
account for the extremely low usage levels of the low-cost low-speed residential product that has a 
5Gb monthly allowance.  Rather, using the Howell and Obren equation, the low levels of purchase 
of this product are more likely attributable to a combination of low user valuations of time and the 
very small speed difference between dial-up and DSL, given that very high quality average speeds 
are achieved via dial-up (46kbps) relative to the speed of the broadband connection (128kbps) 
making the benefits of substitution based upon speed at the low levels of usage evidenced by 
residential consumers effectively negligible.   
 
Thus, only residential users with high-volume and high-speed requirements face penalties from 
usage charges in the New Zealand market.   As the average usage volume per month in the 
residential market is less than 1000Mb and only 5% of residential consumers using the 5Gb product 
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exceed the cap, only a small proportion of the market will have the substitution question 
substantially influenced by the per megabyte charging policy.    
 
3. Market Segment Differences 
If usage charges are insufficient to explain behaviours, then pricing arbitrage appears to be a 
significant factor underpinning New Zealand uptake.  As Figure 11 shows very different arbitrage 
equations for business and residential consumers, it is apposite to analyse these market sector 
differences.  Business users, with packages offering effectively unmetered access up to a variety of 
customised caps, and with much more favourable broadband:dial-up price ratios, might be expected 
to be more likely to purchase the fast product than residential users.  Residential users, though, 
would be expected to prefer the lower-speed unmetered product.   
 
Figure 12 shows the pattern of sales of DSL accounts to business and residential users based upon 
Telecom business designation.  Figure 13 shows the customer breakdown between high speed 
Jetstream and low speed Jetstream Starter within Xtra’s customer base.  Figure 14 shows the 
diffusion of sales of DSL accounts to customers that Telecom bills as business customers, measured 
as a penetration amongst Statistics New Zealand’s database of significant business enterprises 
(280,000 as at February 2002).  These penetration statistics represent a low-side estimate of business 
penetration, as small businesses recorded on the Statistics database may be purchasing DSL 
connections as part of the residential base, whilst not being recorded as businesses in the Telecom 
database.  Moreover, two levels of business enterprise growth are postulated beyond the data from 
2002 – high levels of business growth based upon the high levels of 2001-2002, and slow growth, 
based upon the average growth for the past eight years.   
 
The predicted pattern was in fact the one observed until about a year ago.  At March 2002, slightly 
under 50% of all New Zealand DSL connections were sold to business customers87 compared to 
30% in the United Kingdom, 20% in the United States (BellSouth) and fewer than 5% in France88.  
However, from March 2002 onwards, whist business connection growth has continued steadily, 
residential uptake has surged, so that by April 2003, total residential DSL connections outnumbered 
business ones by a factor of around 1.9:1, yielding proportions similar to those of the UK in 2002 
(Figure 12).   
                                                     
87 Howell and Obren (2002) op. cit 
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Figure 12. Telecom NZ DSL Connections 
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Figure 13. DSL Product Customer Connections 
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Note that Xtra began separating Jetstream and Jetstream Starter (Jetstart) customers in July 2001 
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Figure 14. Business DSL Diffusion per Significant Enterprise 
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Business growth Feb 2002 onwards based on projections – medium and high – due to lack of Statistics NZ data 
 
 
Furthermore, the Xtra data show steady growth of both the residentially-targeted Jetstart and the 
business-targeted Jetstream products.  Clearly, there is significant residential purchase of the faster, 
capped product (approximately 7000 customers purchased Jetstream Home 500 and Jetstream Home 
1000 compared to the 12,900 Jetstart customers in November 2002)89.  Either this is a measure of the 
extent of ‘quasi-business’ use of DSL occurring via residential plans, or there are residential 
consumers whose valuation of time is sufficient to accrue benefits from the speed of Jetstream and 
are prepared to either limit usage or pay the usage premium, or have such low usage that they fall 
beneath the caps.   
 
3.1 Very High per Business Unit Penetration 
Nonetheless, Figure 12 shows very different purchasing patterns between business and residential 
customers.  Furthermore, business penetration by business size and geographic location show very 
high levels compared to other countries, consistent with the comparatively robust performance of 
New Zealand business connectivity and utilisation of the Internet in Figure 10.   Figure 14 shows 
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that, even using the very conservative methods of estimating business penetration outlined above, a 
DSL penetration rate of between 8 and 8.5 per 100 of New Zealand’s approximately 285,000 
statistically significant business enterprises at March 2003.  This does not include connections to any 
of the other broadband platforms, and as identified above, is an acknowledged under-representation 
of the true level of business penetration. This business penetration level is particularly impressive in 
the face of international comparison.  Australia, for example, has a target of 3% of all businesses 
using broadband in 200390.   New Zealand passed this level in DSL penetration alone in April 2001.   
 
Furthermore, New Zealand’s high levels of business DSL connectivity are not just confined to 
metropolitan locations.  Figure 15 shows the regional diffusion of the technology.  It is noted that the 
base used in this analysis is geographic units, so it captures each regional branch of each of the 
significant enterprises represented in Figure 14.  Hence the two sets of figures are not directly 
comparable. 
 
Figure 15. Regional Business DSL Penetration per Significant Geographic Unit 
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Figure 15 shows that at April 2003, New Zealand had a minimum business DSL penetration rate 
alone of 7.2 per 100 sites where business is transacted.  This ranges from 9.2 per 100 in Auckland to 
                                                     
 
 6/11/2003                                                            47 
90 NOIE (2002) op. cit.   
2.1 per 100 in Tasman.  Significantly, apart from Auckland’s strong showing, there does not appear 
to be a strong metropolitan-provincial divide in this data, as Otago, with a large rural hinterland is 
second with 8.0 per 100, and provincial Gisborne third with 7.9 per 10091.  Wellington (7.9) and 
Canterbury (7.4) come next, followed by Nelson (6.8), Taranaki (5.9), Hawkes Bay (5.8), Waikato 
(4.8), Southland (4.7), Bay of Plenty (4.5), Manawatu-Wanganui (4.3), Marlborough (4.0), 
Northland (3.7) and West Coast (3.6).  Thus, even New Zealand’s worst-performing region, Tasman, 
when measured on DSL penetration per significant business location, is close to the target set for all 
methods of broadband penetration per significant Australian enterprise in 2003.   
 
It is important in comparing business connectivity to the Internet that businesses of like size and 
dimension are compared.  New Zealand businesses are very small by world standards.  The United 
Kingdom reports92 that in November 2002, 5% of its Small and Medium (SME) businesses 
connecting to the Internet use broadband (equates to 3.5% of businesses in total).  The comparable 
figure for all significant New Zealand enterprises at that point was 7.0% (geographic units 6.3%).   
Fewer than 0.5% of New Zealand’s 285,000 significant businesses have more than 100 employees.  
Thus, New Zealand’s total business uptake ostensibly falls within the UK’s SME category, with 
New Zealand business DSL penetration appearing to be twice the business broadband penetration of 
the UK.   
 
Using the Telecom business database, it is reported that over 50% of business enterprises with 10 or 
more employees in this register subscribe to DSL.  Even allowing for the difference in size between 
the Telecom and Statistics New Zealand databases, this statistic compares very favourably to 
Norway, which reports only 20% of businesses using all broadband methods in this category93.  This 
is especially interesting, given that Norway (12th) lies significantly ahead of New Zealand in the 
number of broadband connections per 100 population.  
 
Noting that the cited figures are a deliberate low level estimate based upon population data, and 
given that they relate only to one technology platform, DSL, there is significant evidence that the 
high levels of business Internet connectivity and use exhibited in Figure 10 translate into equally 
impressive OECD-leading levels of business connectivity to broadband technologies.  There is no 
evidence of business sector lags in broadband connectivity.  Indeed, New Zealand leads 
                                                     
91 It is noted that this is a similar pattern found in website and email addresses by geography in New Zealand – see 
Howell, Bronwyn.  2001.  The Rural-Urban “Digital Divide” in New Zealand: Fact or Fable?  Prometheus 19(3): 231-252 
92 Oftel (2002) op. cit.  
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comparative benchmark countries by significant amounts in respect of the SME and micro 
business segments.  These are the very business segments that broadband technologies are designed 
to serve94, as larger businesses generally use leased T-1 connections (NZ has penetrations of around 
50 per 100 in this technology per business with over 100 employees).   
 
High broadband penetration levels for businesses give double reasons for celebration.  Firstly, if 
there are measurable productivity gains to be made from the use of broadband information exchange, 
then these are most likely to originate from the business sector95.  Secondly, as small and medium 
businesses are deemed the most likely to benefit from broadband, as opposed to other methods of 
information exchange such as leased T-1 connections96, then the fact that so many of New Zealand’s 
small and medium (10 plus employees) and micro (fewer than 10) businesses are already using the 
technology, relative to other countries, is very reassuring.  If there are benefits to be gained, then 
New Zealand businesses are well placed relative to their overseas counterparts to gain these benefits.  
Indeed, these benefits are presumably already being reaped. 
 
3.2 Residential Broadband Penetration is the Laggard 
If New Zealand has a ‘broadband problem’ at all, it would appear to be confined to penetration of 
residential connections, which appears to be the one metric that is contributing to pulling New 
Zealand’s otherwise OECD-leading Internet statistics back into the also-rans.  As all of pricing 
arbitrage between broadband and dial-up, per megabyte charging and the individual valuations of 
leisure time may all be implicated in this low level, it is apposite to consider the relative effects of 
each of these to the residential purchase decision.    
 
It is well recognised that worldwide, user valuation of leisure time tends to be low.  Varian identifies 
in his INDEX studies that the valuation of users’ leisure time at Berkeley University was around 
0.5c per minute in respect of the willingness to pay extra for faster Internet connections.  Hence, 
even if New Zealanders’ value is low, so is that in other countries that rank higher in residential 
broadband uptake.  Given that the value of user time is so low, the relative speed of technologies 
assumes less importance in the Howell and Obren substitution equation, as the value of time savings 
is small when only low volumes are transferred.  This is further diminished given that the time taken 
to exchange information is extremely small compared to the time taken by the user (either manually 
                                                     
94 OECD (2002) op. cit.  pp  9-10 
95 OECD (2002) op. cit.  
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or using computer applications) to process that information once it is received.  The differences in 
transfer speeds between dial-up and DSL at prevailing New Zealand speeds and qualities would, 
for the very low average levels of megabytes exchanged by DSL users in the Xtra database, 
amount to less that a few minutes each day.  Thus, in the substitution decision between dial-up 
and broadband, at the low user valuations of time exhibited, the effect of the savings from 
broadband speed to the average residential consumer is negligible. 
 
Indeed, given the speeds at which information is transferred over the Internet, constraints in user 
time are more likely to occur from constraints in distribution and processing at either end of the 
Internet chain (servers, etc.) than from the transmission itself.  For example, server speeds of many 
public newsgroups are extremely slow – users must pay additional fees to access information off 
servers with faster speeds.  No matter how capable the user’s connection to the Internet is, if the 
servers from which information is regularly obtained are slow, then faster transmission speeds will 
have negligible effect on the total time taken to receive data.  Using the transport analogy, no matter 
how fast the truck is, if the loading process is slow, overall speed of transport from ordering to 
receipt will appear slow to the recipient.    
 
3.3 Pricing Arbitrage and Residential Purchasing Decisions 
Thus, holding applications constant, in the absence of any real evidence of considerable savings 
in time for the small volumes of information actually moved, fixed access pricing arbitrage 
appears to be the solitary explanation for New Zealand’s low residential broadband penetration 
rates.  Not that the broadband products are expensive – Figure 9 shows they rank very competitively 
with the offerings of the rest of the OECD.  Rather, it is the extremely favourable dial-up prices that 
are depressing residential uptake.  But that is not ‘bad’ in the sense that it is not constraining use of 
the Internet – Figure 10 shows this is the case.  Welfare benefits are being accrued, just using dial-up 
rather than broadband technologies.   Manipulating dial-up prices may raise broadband purchase in 
lieu of dial-up – Figures 10 and 11 show that this is certainly what is occurring in France.  However, 
Figure 10 shows that merely because more people are connecting to the Internet using broadband in 
France, it does not necessarily follow that they are actually using that connectivity more 
productively.  In all of the access technology-agnostic statistics in Figure 10, France shows far less 
evidence of Internet use for productive return, in both the business and residential sectors.   
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The conclusion that this analysis appears to invite is that, worldwide, it is not the superior speed 
capabilities of broadband that are inducing residential purchase for the majority of users with 
identical information exchange needs.  Rather it is pricing arbitrage between the two technologies 
for basic connectivity to the Internet that appears to be the key determining factor at the current 
point in time.  New Zealand is not alone in this being a significant factor depressing broadband 
uptake – Hausman has identified that factor is significant in the United States’ comparatively poor 
performance in the broadband penetration metric97. 
 
4. Applications 
Having accounted for all other influences upon the substitution decision, application availability 
remains the only other potential explanation of New Zealand’s low level of residential broadband 
uptake the applications.  Specifically, are there applications which require the high information 
volume and speed capabilities of broadband that are being used in other countries but not in New 
Zealand?  If there are, then this could explain the difference in broadband penetration rates.  If there 
are not, then the conclusion must be that there are just not the applications available worldwide that 
require broad band’s capabilities, and that offer sufficient benefits in increased productivity or utility 
that users are prepared to pay the current broadband prices in order to use them.   If this is the case, 
then international broadband penetration statistics are solely a reflection of pricing arbitrage between 
different technology platforms in different countries (including bundling of broadband Internet 
access with other applications such as basic telephony and cable television).    
 
If application shortage is demonstrated, then policy interventions inducing substitution by 
encouraging pricing arbitrage may influence the choice of method via which individuals connect to 
the Internet, but such policies may have very little impact upon the extent of productive benefits 
gained beyond initial switching to the ‘cheaper’ technology.  Such policy interventions are also 
largely impotent in encouraging the development of new applications, and can do little of 
themselves to encourage increasing application usage rates and accrual of user learning, which have 
been shown to be the predominant determinants of increasing bandwidth consumption98.    
4.1 Electronic Applications 
Most empirical and survey evidence in New Zealand and overseas confirms that only a limited 
number of applications are routinely used by businesses, and that the most valuable of these are 
                                                     
97 Hausman (2002) op cit.   
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assessed by the businesses to be email and web browsing99.  Whilst these applications are deemed 
productivity-raising by their users, they do not require large quantities of information to be 
exchanged100.   It is only when large, customised information exchange applications such as B2B 
exchanges and supply chain management systems are employed that large quantities of data are 
routinely exchanged.  However, these applications are not necessarily those most likely to be used 
productively by New Zealand’s large number of small businesses, given that these businesses 
generally have only a handful of suppliers and customers, and relatively few reasons to exchange 
information with any of them.  Furthermore, the low usage of relatively mature, high-volume 
applications such as video-conferencing by these businesses, despite the prices faced, tends to 
indicate that the productive benefits of these applications are low relative to their costs, and useful 
only in specific circumstances, rather than being used routinely as are email and web browsing101.   
 
Indeed, unstructured applications such as email are probably far more suited to these businesses than 
structured, specific applications.  The low transfer needs of these typically used applications provide 
the most logical explanation for Xtra’s observation that the greatest pressure on transfer capacity 
occurs in the evening, when businesses are not typically consuming.   Despite high levels of 
broadband penetration in businesses, average data transfer per business is low, due to the types of 
applications typically used.  By extension, bandwidth consumed is not necessarily proportional to 
increases in productivity for New Zealand’s micro, small and medium businesses.   
 
Similar limited application bases for residential users emerge in surveys worldwide102.  It is only in a 
handful of specific geographic locations that significant applications differences emerge.   
 
The appendix on South Korea identifies a handful of applications that are routinely available in that 
country but not in New Zealand, including Voice-over-IP and un-policed streaming of audio and 
video content in a legal environment that does not enforce copyright.  Voice-over-IP is popular in 
South Korea as a result of relative pricing of fixed line and Internet telephony prices.  However, 
New Zealand residential telephony prices are in the lower half of the OECD already103, meaning that 
this application is unlikely to be as popular in New Zealand unless it is associated with substantial 
price reductions.  Currently prevailing un-metered local call access would further discourage the use 
                                                                                                                                                                  
98 Howell and Obren (2002) op cit.   
99 Clark et al., (2002) op. cit.; Howell and O’Connell (2003) op. cit.; Statistics New Zealand.  2002.  Information 
Technology Use in New Zealand: 2001.  Wellington, New Zealand: Statistics New Zealand.   
100 Howell and Obren (2002) op. cit.  
101 Howell and O’Connell (2003) op. cit.  
102 Anderson et al. (2001) op. cit.  - UK;  NOIE (2002) op. cit. - Australia;  
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of Voice-over-IP in the New Zealand market.  Furthermore, New Zealand copyright laws do not 
tolerate unrestricted copying, distribution and streaming of copyright material, thereby reducing the 
relative application potential of the two countries.   
 
Additionally, in the market for entertainment products, Internet entertainment applications compete 
with all other entertainment applications.  The range of entertainment substitutes in South Korea is 
much more limited than that in New Zealand, making entertainment options such as video and audio 
streaming and interactive games more popular than in New Zealand, where a variety of 
entertainment options, including participating in and viewing sport, sailing, skiing, and other 
outdoor activities, along with many broadcast entertainment options (free and pay-to-air television, 
radio etc.) compete with Internet-based entertainment options (e.g. interactive gaming, video on 
demand).  Policy interventions aimed at infrastructure supply are unable of themselves to address 
this fundamental demand-side application choice and availability issue.  Indeed, reducing the price 
of access to Internet-based entertainment applications relative to other entertainment applications 
may induce price-based substitution away from sport and other physical recreation activities, with a 
consequent reduction in the performance indicators of the health sector.  
 
Furthermore, if entertainment applications are the dominant driver of demand for broadband in other 
jurisdictions, there are caps to the amount of entertainment consumption that an individual can 
undertake within available budgets of time and cash.  Saether (in the Scandinavian countries) and 
Galbi (US) both show that entertainment spending has not increased over the twentieth century by 
any more than the available leisure hours – merely the form of entertainment spending has been 
substituted104.   
 
4.2 Cable, Content and Creation Incentives 
Another valid application justification arises from comparing New Zealand application usage with 
that of the United States, which exhibits four times the broadband penetration of New Zealand, but 
approximately similar levels of DSL penetration.  The most significant applications difference 
between the United States and New Zealand is that cable television packages incorporating cable 
broadband Internet access are widely available in the United States, whereas cable packages in New 
                                                                                                                                                                  
103 Howell and Obren (2003) op cit. 
104 Saether, Jan-Petter.  1999.  Limits to Growth in Telecom Markets?  Chapter 12 in Loomis, David G., and Lester D. 
Taylor, eds. The Future of the Telecommunications Industry: Forecasting and Demand Analysis.  Norwell, Massachusetts: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers; Galbi, Douglas.  2001.  Some Economics of Personal Activity and Implications for the 
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Zealand are restricted to a narrow population base (Wellington and some parts of Christchurch).  
Cable broadband purchase outweighs DSL purchase in the United States by a factor of 
approximately 2.5:1105.   Despite the argument that cable and DSL are competitors in a single market 
in the Untied States106, it has also been argued that cable television content forms part of the product 
that influences the decision of US broadband purchasers107.  Without tied content to offer in a bundle 
with infrastructure access (i.e. television content, the copyright to which may in fact confer market 
power of the bundled product), DSL is in a different market, and the products are not remotely close 
substitutes.    
 
4.2.1 Cable Content and Infrastructure Access Bundles 
Moreover, bundling opportunities provide pricing advantages for cable providers108.  The large 
majority of cable broadband subscribers in the United States, and other jurisdictions where cable is 
the dominant broadband technology, offer the product as part of a bundle with television content.  
Bakos and Brynjolfsson have shown that bundling products with near zero marginal cost with each 
other in bundles increases sales, supplier profits and efficiency.  As both cable content and 
broadband access fit this scenario once the initial cable connection is purchased, broadband Internet 
access can be offered in the bundle at a price near to marginal cost.   This may be a significant 
contributor to the high levels of cable purchase relative to broadband (between 2:1 and 4:1) in most 
OECD countries that offer cable broadband services109.  If bundling of this type is occurring then, 
high levels of broadband uptake in these countries may merely be a consequence of pricing arbitrage 
making the bundled cable product substantially cheaper than alternative Internet access technologies.   
 
If it is indeed content and infrastructure bundles that provide the pricing arbitrage incentives to 
favour cable broadband access over any other form of broadband or narrowband access, then this 
solitary application difference may be the single most significant factor accounting for New 
Zealand’s low broadband uptake.  It is interesting to note that without the incentive of content 
bundles, DSL uptake in the US is similar to that of New Zealand.  Given the similarities of 
residential DSL prices in the two countries, there is substantial anecdotal credibility to support this 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Digital Economy.  Paper presented at the 19th Annual International Communications Forecasting Conference, Washington, 
DC.; June 26-29, 2001.   
105 Howell (2002) op cit. 
106 Crandall, Sidak and Singer (2001) op. cit.  
107 Howell (2002) op. cit.  
108 Bakos, Yannis; and Erik Brynjolfsson.  1999.  Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits and Efficiency.  
Management Science, 45(12), pp1613-1630.  
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explanation, especially given that there is no evidence of business reluctance to purchase broadband 
in New Zealand. 
 
By way of a comparison, whilst New Zealand does not have a nationwide cable television product 
with which Internet access can be bundled, it does have a digital satellite-based pay television 
service with 516,731 subscribers, amounting to a penetration rate of 28.3% of households within its 
reach, at December 31, 2002110.  This is in addition to the 123,360 (12.2% penetration) of 
subscribers to its UHF pay TV service.   Since late 2002, this service has offered email services with 
the digital product, effectively competing with ISPs for that share of the 850,000 dial-up customer 
market that accesses the Internet for email applications only.   The potential exists for this provider 
to use the digital satellite infrastructure to compete directly with ISPs for wider Internet access 
services.  If bundling of Internet access via cable with television content is indeed prompting 
purchase of cable broadband subscriptions in other countries, then in order to get a true a true 
comparison between New Zealand broadband penetration and that of other countries, New Zealand’s 
broadband share must be adjusted to reflect the proportion of purchases of digital satellite mail 
access that in other countries would be registered as broadband sales. 
 
4.2.2 Cable, Content and Increasing Broadband Penetration 
It has been argued that policy interventions such as LLU may open up opportunities for content 
providers to distribute their applications over the telephony network, thereby offering opportunities 
for both increasing residential broadband uptake in New Zealand, and incentivising the creation of 
new applications and content. 
 
However, it is unclear as yet whether the linkage between cable broadband purchase and broadband 
penetration is merely a function of pricing arbitrage or a function of linking specific content 
(copyright movies) and Internet access in general.  Whilst video on demand is often cited as an 
application requiring the capabilities of broadband, as yet there is little evidence that it is extensively 
used in any environment other than South Korea.  For example, in the United States market, the 
weekly household budget for all forms of video on demand (including hiring videos) is around 
US$10 per week, amounting to around only three movies111.    
                                                                                                                                                                  
109 Howell, Bronwyn.  2002.  Broadband Uptake and Infrastructure Regulation: Evidence from the OECD Countries.  
Communications and Strategies, 47:33-62. 
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 The New Zealand evidence tends to favour pricing arbitrage as the dominant effect, as given the low 
prices and wide availability of broadband in this country, if video content was driving residential 
purchase, it could have been reasonably expected that a product linking content and infrastructure on 
the DSL network would have emerged112.  Given the very low average volumes of residential data 
transported, there is little evidence to suggest that video on demand via the DSL network is 
significant, even in the form of copyright owners entering into contracts with infrastructure 
providers to replicate the cable product.  This tends to reinforce the argument that pricing arbitrage 
for access to the Internet is the dominant effect. 
 
4.2.3 Shortage of Applications 
Having eliminated all other possible explanations for low residential broadband uptake in New 
Zealand, and the low levels of data transfer overall in both the business and residential markets, the 
remaining explanation for both low levels of purchase reflecting delays in the substitution of dial-up 
with broadband is that, as yet, there are few applications for which the productivity benefits of 
substituting overcome the additional costs of access.  If this is the case, then no amount of 
infrastructure (supply side) intervention is going to alter the situation.  Interventions to raise 
productive broadband usage thus must relate to demand side factors.  This can only occur by 
increasing the range of productivity-raising applications requiring information transport from which 
                                                     
112 Whilst technically feasible, it is yet to be proven that it is economically sustainable for providers of entertainment 
content to distribute it satisfactorily using unbundled as opposed to owned infrastructure, due to the unique economic 
characteristics of information content – specifically the fact that it has high fixed costs of creation and near zero costs of 
reproduction [Hazlett, Thomas W.; and George Bittlingmayer.  2001.  The Political Economy of Open Access.  Brookings 
Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Working Paper 01-06.].  Furthermore, the total amount of content created may be less.  
Generally, the ability to recoup an investment on information content creation requires control of both the content and the 
delivery mechanism.  This explains why newspaper chains, for example, generally require unique distribution for their 
stories within a single newspaper, rather than ‘blending’ stories from a variety of sources into a single infrastructure (a 
solitary edition, for example, containing both Fairfax and Murdoch stories).  It is the returns from selling the physical 
paper that generate the certainty for content creators, who have made high fixed cost but low reproduction cost 
information products.  Without certainty from the newspaper that the returns from sale of the physical paper will be 
collected from the end consumer, freelance content creation will not occur.  If the cost of the infrastructure (the 
newspaper) is small compared to the value the consumer places on the information content, then multiple infrastructures 
will be purchased (many people purchase 2 or more daily newspapers).   The information creator has incentives to 
integrate content production and infrastructure (even ‘freelance’ journalists become associated with one newspaper chain 
rather than multiple).   
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Rather, the model that appears to have emerged in practice in environments where LLU exists and content bundling is not 
expressly prohibited is common ownership of competing platforms by consortia of content and infrastructure providers (as 
occurs in Australia), with its attendant implications upon the depression of broadband uptake [OECD (2001) op. cit. ].  It is 
indeed possible that an LLU environment enabling the owner of the solitary cable infrastructure in New Zealand to assume 
a range of property rights to an otherwise competing infrastructure (telecommunications) might effectively achieve via 
regulatory fiat the same penetration-limiting circumstances that common ownership of competing infrastructures has 
induced in Australia, Denmark and other such OECD countries [OECD (2001) op. cit.], in addition to any reduction in 
competition that may occur as a result of reduction in investment in the existing infrastructure. 
users may select.  These applications must embrace new ways of using information, rather than 
merely creating more content from which users can select within their already constrained budgets 
of cash and time.  In the business sector, this may entail sector-driven initiatives in areas such as 
health and education; in the residential sector it probably requires developing information exchanges 
that are not constrained by human consumption bottlenecks, and which offer benefits greater than 
the range of benefits residential users currently enjoy. 
 
Most importantly, however, solving the applications shortage is a challenge best addressed on the 
demand side.  Endeavouring to encourage application development by oversupplying infrastructure 
will inevitably result in new applications being created.  However, there is a very strong probability 
that the applications developed as a result may not be the most efficient use of inventive and 
innovative energy.  Focusing all inventive effort on making ‘square-shaped cargoes’ merely because 
‘square-shaped trucks’ are oversupplied may divert effort away from developing even more valuable 
cargoes of different shapes, the trucks for which have not yet even been invented.  If the benefits 
foregone from these new products exceed the benefits of the ‘square-shaped’ cargoes, then the result 
is lower productivity than might have otherwise been achieved, and a welfare loss to society. 
 
Furthermore, the applications solution need not be focused merely upon the productivity 
enhancements arising from Internet-based information exchange.  Internet application productivity 
benefits arise from the exchange of information between physically separate entities.  However, 
Internet-based information exchange comprises only a very small proportion of the total amount of 
information moved.  In the United States, of all bandwidth available, only 2% is required for Internet 
transfers (external transfers)  – the remaining 98% of capacity is used for dedicated point-to-point 
transfers within firms and directly linked entities113.  When accounting for the shared use of the 
resource by Internet users, approximately 90% of information transferred is internal.  New Zealand 
data show that 90% of CityLink’s capacity is dark fibre linking facilities directly.  Only 10% is used 
for Internet-like transmission.  If the vast majority if information transfer relates to internal 
information, then applications offering more productive ways of using this internal information may 
provide greater benefit per research dollar than the small quantity of external information that 
apparently are used between entities.  This implies research into how information is used is a 
necessary  prerequisite to any further policy development with respect to promoting the use of ICTs.  
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Implications for Policymakers 
In conclusion it appears that: 
• New Zealand exhibits high Internet use; 
• Internet penetration is high; 
• Broadband is widely available in New Zealand; 
• Choice of broadband platform exists for most New Zealanders; 
• Business broadband penetration is very high by world standards; 
• It is only residential broadband penetration that is low relative to OECD figures; 
• Residential and business broadband prices compare favourably with overseas counterparts; 
• Residential DSL consumption per customer is very low, even for low-priced products with 
generous downloading caps; 
• Despite claims of consumer perception of the value of broad band’s speed, at volumes currently 
exchanged, the time saving to New Zealanders from broad band’s transfer speed is negligible;  
• Substitution decisions are made on the basis of other factors – principally application value and 
pricing arbitrage in accessing the Internet; 
• Low dial-up prices bias residential users to access the Internet using this technology, despite 
DSL prices comparable to other countries with higher broadband penetration; 
• Low dial-up prices and low DSL exchange volumes together suggest a shortage of applications 
requiring the capabilities of broadband which the customers value sufficiently to pay the small 
price premium – regulatory intervention on the supply side is impotent to address this issue; 
• Widespread availability of cable television content and infrastructure bundles is the single most 
significant differentiator between New Zealand’s residential market and comparison countries 
(noting South Korea is not a viable counterfactual due to the differences in copyright 
enforcement); 
• Pricing arbitrage to access the Internet, and absence of cable content bundles appear to be the 
main factors depressing residential broadband uptake in New Zealand; 
• Ultimate accrual of benefits lies with the utilisation of existing applications and the creation of 
new ones.  Any direct economic or social benefits from supply-side regulatory intervention will 
be small and transitory compared with the creation and use of applications.  An apparent current 
worldwide shortage of such applications even in countries where extensive supply side 
regulatory intervention exists underlines that technology availability will not be the primary 
driver of application creation and consequent benefit accrual.   
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There is little evidence of a widespread market failure in the provision of Internet access services 
in New Zealand.  
 
NZ has achieved almost every aspect of the environment that the OECD claims is required to ensure 
the accrual of economic and social benefits of an information economy – widespread availability of 
multiple competing technology platforms, widespread use of the Internet, comparatively low prices 
of all Internet access technologies, and wide availability of the competing broadband platforms.  
Alternative platforms exist in almost all areas, with the exception of perhaps a small number of rural 
localities.   
 
There is only one statistic that is apparently anomalous – the number of broadband connections per 
100 New Zealanders.  Yet even this statistic masks the fact that New Zealand exhibits world-leading 
penetration of broadband in the business sector, and especially in the SME business sector that is 
most likely to benefit from broadband.  The most likely explanation for the high observed levels of 
business uptake of the technology is pricing arbitrage due to the per minute call cost faced by 
dial-up users, and the variety of broadband packages enabling business customers to select and 
pay for a data exchange volume that meets their needs, without having to subsidise heavier users 
via flat-rate plans.  
 
If there is a problem, it relates to broadband penetration in the residential sector.  The most likely 
explanation for New Zealand’s low level of residential broadband uptake is a high relative price 
of broadband compared to dial-up access. However, this arises not because of expensive 
broadband, but an abundance of cheap, high quality dial-up access.    
 
However, it is noted that a shortage of applications is probably constraining demand growth.  This is 
not a problem unique to New Zealand, as it has been noted in other countries114.    
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1. The Existing Policy Regime Has Delivered This Outcome 
The New Zealand Internet access market environment described above has been achieved almost 
entirely under the policy regime prevailing prior to the Telecommunications Act 2001.  Absence of 
overt regulatory intervention with the intention of influencing prices to encourage overall broadband 
penetration in isolation from the accrual of benefits from productive use of information exchange 
has delivered the environment most likely to encourage long-term productivity growth from the use 
of information exchange.   
 
Faced only by the characteristics of the market, New Zealand broadband providers have responded 
by offering the most advantageous pricing options (multiple pricing and downloading options to 
cater for varying exchange demands) in the business sector.  The variety of packages offered ensures 
that businesses of all dimensions can access services and pay prices appropriate to their level of 
demand.  This is the most efficient way of offering services, as flat-rate plans require low users to 
pay more than the costs of their demand, and hence subsidise high users.  Pricing arbitrage with 
respect to the ratio of broadband prices to dial-up has also favoured business users.  Again, this is 
efficient in respect of generating measurable productivity enhancements, as measured productivity 
growth will almost certainly be generated by the business sector.   
 
Moreover, there is no expectation in the current pricing regime that one sector or one group of users 
should subsidise another via universal flat rate pricing plans.  If each user is encouraged to pay the 
full cost of information transport demanded, then the amounts of information transported will be 
closer to the efficient level than when large cross-subsidies via flat-rate plans encourage over-use by 
some users at the expense of others.  This is especially relevant in the residential market, where the 
vast majority of users (even on flat-rate plans) have small usage demands.  It is efficient that heavy 
users should limit their use of a scarce costly resource (the Southern Cross Cable) to that which 
actually generates benefit or utility in excess of its marginal cost.  
 
Thus, if increases in productivity are indeed the objective of encouraging use of broadband, then the 
New Zealand market has evolved to meet this objective.  This is not surprising, given that each 
individual decision about substitution of technology is ultimately underpinned by enhancements in 
productivity.   
 
However, if this objective is overridden by a policy objective to deliver increased utilisation of a 
specific technology in isolation from the productivity-enhancing factors, then there is no guarantee 
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that the end result is indeed productivity enhancing.  The result of such a policy may be over-
investment in infrastructure capacity that lies idle awaiting a use.  Indeed, there is evidence that the 
financial difficulties faced by telecommunications companies in the United States may be attributed 
to just this type of intervention115.  These difficulties have been largely avoided in New Zealand, as 
no such overt policy objectives with associated supply-side regulatory intervention have been 
employed to date.  
 
2. What About LLU? 
It is apposite, therefore, to consider what this finding means in advance of the Telecommunications 
Commissioner’s recommendation on Local Loop Unbundling.  One of the primary justifications 
given for LLU is that it is purported “to increase penetration of broadband services”116.  Yet, if the 
benefits of Internet information exchange are already being gained, should it matter which 
technology is used?   
 
As there is no evidence of a supply shortage throughout the country, up to six competing broadband 
platforms, and little evidence of a broadband pricing problem relative to other markets for services 
of like quality, what more can LLU offer?  LLU is unable to address the fundamental application 
shortage problem so the only significant outcome it may induce may be to influence broadband 
pricing on the telephony network, a network that will never, due to its technological limitations, 
reach all New Zealand homes and places of business.  However, eencouraging a ‘price war’ on the 
telephony network may undermine the financial viability of the competing infrastructures capable of 
providing a truly national service (wireless, satellite, mobile telephony), threatening their existence, 
with the net result that rural connectivity in the long run may be decreased rather than increased.  
This will inevitably result in a reduction of competition the New Zealand market (fewer 
infrastructures) and an increase in market power of the telephony network as Internet information 
transport provider if it results in a consolidation on only one infrastructure (telephony) with a limited 
number of operators forced to co-operate via regulatory fiat to provide products and services to 
consumers.   
 
Whilst pricing intervention may increase substitution by residential consumers as a consequence of 
pricing arbitrage, it is debatable if there is a tangible productivity-based justification for encouraging 
this action at the current point in time.  Given the very small number of residential users consuming 
                                                     
115 Merrill Lynch.  2002.  Telecom Sector Review 20 November 2002.  Merrill Lynch Asia Pacific Telecommunications. 
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large quantities of data exchange, pricing arbitrage will likely to confer a disproportionate benefit on 
these heavy users who are currently being encouraged to cover their additional costs.  Marginal 
users, who consume very small information exchanges at a cost of production far less than the price 
they are expected to pay, must fund this benefit.    
 
In the absence of any concrete evidence that LLU of itself is capable of increasing productive 
output, the overriding policy question facing the Telecommunications Commissioner must be: ‘is it 
worth the risk of jeopardising all of the positive measurements New Zealand has already achieved in 
order to find out if the policy works in stimulating the one proxy in which New Zealand currently 
appears to be lagging, and which of itself is of dubious merit in assessing long-term productivity 
gains?’ 
 
3. Conclusion 
The New Zealand ‘light-handed’ regulatory environment, with little direct regulatory intervention 
into the market for broadband services, has enabled perhaps the only ‘live counterfactual’ to the 
extensive intervention in other OECD countries, such as the United State, Australia and the 
European Union, where policies specifically targeted at promoting broadband penetration have been 
applied.  This paper shows that, in terms of applying resources to greatest productive effect, there is 
little evidence of emergence of a supply-side market failure.   
 
Rather, the relative absence of intervention, combined with the unique opportunity to observe the 
development of broadband information exchange markets in the absence of a distorting content-
transfer product bundle such as cable offers, has provided an almost unique opportunity to observe 
the outcomes of the intersection of supply and demand for purely information transfer services, as 
offered by the Internet.  The results of this study lead to the primary conclusion that worldwide, 
there is probably a shortage currently of productivity-enhancing applications requiring the speed and 
capacity characteristics of broadband, and that overall, broadband penetration statistics are almost 
solely a result of pricing arbitrage in order to access the Internet GPT.   
 
Low broadband uptake is therefore, in New Zealand at least, not a supply-side problem.  The 
‘solutions’ to ‘fixing’ it lie on the demand side.  Infrastructure regulation is impotent to solve this 
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underlying ‘problem’, as it arises from a shortage of cargoes awaiting transportation.  More trucks 
and more roads will not fundamentally alter this scenario. 
 
The findings from the New Zealand counterfactual pose cogent issues for policy-makers in other 
jurisdictions.  Whilst flat-rate pricing regimes have been favoured internationally, variable pricing 
and usage products in New Zealand have made it economically feasible for small businesses (those 
deemed most likely to benefit from the use of broadband) to access the benefits of the technology 
without having to incur the costs of subsidising larger, heavier users.  This is evidenced in New 
Zealand’s very high broadband penetration rates for businesses.  Other countries struggling to 
stimulate business uptake may take note of this significant New Zealand finding.    
 
Moreover, the New Zealand findings have drawn into sharp relief the issues of whether it is 
desirable to emphasise innovation, research and development to support residential uptake of the 
technology at the expense of business uptake, given that productivity benefits are largely provided 
by the business sector.  Where scare resources must be allocated, prioritising business research and 
development offers larger productivity benefits.  Yet ‘national performance’ in the ‘information 
economy’ race tends to be dominated by measures that reflect residential use of the technology.  
However, in New Zealand, absent policy interventions focused upon expanding residential 
consumption, broadband product innovation has occurred principally in the business sector.  If 
incentivising innovation for the benefit of the residential sector removes resources from innovating 
for the business sector, penetration statistics will certainly increase, but measurable productivity 
gains may be scarcer.  Furthermore, if the vast majority of information transferred pertains to 
internal business movements, the scope for productivity gains may be greater in applications that are 
not even Internet-based.  
 
The challenge facing policy-makers in the light of these findings is now one of stimulating solutions 
not to the infrastructure supply-side problem, but to the applications demand-side problem.   
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Appendix 1. Performance Measurement in an Information 
Economy 
This Appendix was written as background for a submission prepared in response to the Commerce 
Commission’s Local Loop Unbundling issues paper.  It is reproduced here for the purposes of 
identifying the inadequacies of using a solitary metric – broadband penetration – as the indicator of 
potential to benefit from the use of the Internet and Electronic Commerce.   
 
The Issues Paper identifies the main rationale underpinning LLU adoption in most jurisdictions is 
“to increase penetration of broadband services”117.  However, no substantiation is offered as to why 
increased broadband penetration per se is a desirable policy objective, given that there is 
considerable theoretical debate and disagreement over how, why or even if, universally available 
fast, cheap Internet access contributes to the accrual of economic and social benefits.    
 
Whilst the exact relationships between infrastructure availability and the accrual of measurable 
economic and social benefits are as yet unclear, there is a growing body of empirical and theoretical 
research that casts significant doubt upon the efficacy of using any solitary metric, including 
broadband penetration, to proxy either actual or potential economic or social gains from the Internet.  
If the overarching policy objective of the Commerce Commission is to promote the long-term 
benefit of the end-users of the Internet, which encompasses many more networks and platforms than 
the telecommunications infrastructures currently governed by the Telecommunications Act, then is 
the Commerce Commission justified in using broadband penetration as the solitary proxy by which 
this benefit, either actual or prospective, is to be measured?  If it cannot, then the entire basis for 
promoting LLU as a tool to increase economic and social benefit by promoting broadband 
penetration is flawed.   
A.1.1 Theoretical Linkages: Broadband Penetration and Consumer Welfare 
The mechanisms via which computers contribute to measured economic and social performance are 
far from clearly understood118, and measured productivity improvement attributable to the 
                                                     
117 Issues Paper para 396 p 98.  
118 See for example:  
Abramovitz, Moses and Paul A. David.  2001.  Two Centuries of American Macroeconomic Growth From Exploitation of 
Resource Abundance to Knowledge-Driven Development.  Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Discussion Paper 
Number 01-05. 
Brynjolfsson, Erik and Shinkyu Yang.  1999.  The Intangible Costs and Benefits of Computer Investments:  Evidence from 
the Financial Markets.  Working Paper. 
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considerable capital investment in computers over the past 30 years has fallen far short of original 
projections119, giving rise to Solow’s famous paradox “we see computers everywhere but in the 
productivity statistics”120.   Yet the accrual of benefits from utilisation of broadband technologies is 
contingent almost exclusively upon the utilisation of computer-based applications121.  To date, 
accurate attribution of productivity benefits to investment in Internet infrastructures and Internet-
based applications has been equally as problematical as that for investment in computers122, giving 
rise to the suggestion that the ‘computer productivity paradox’ is metamorphosing to incorporate a 
similar ‘broadband productivity paradox’123.   
 
The purpose of this section is to raise theoretical debate about the validity of penetration of 
broadband connections per head of population as an appropriate policy target, and the ability of LLU 
to deliver on this metric.  This debate is crucial in determining the basis for estimating the extent of 
public benefit and detriment as a consequence of adopting an LLU policy in New Zealand.  If 
broadband penetration is a poor proxy for determining social benefit and detriment, how reliable is a 
policy that delivers only that proxy in delivering the ultimately desired gains?  What are the costs 
and risks associated with the extent of accuracy of the proxy?  And how much weight should be 
given to policies that deliver the broadband penetration proxy over policies that deliver other proxies 
that may be equally or more significant in delivering the ultimate objective? 
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Communications and Strategies, 47:33-62. 
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Figure A1. OECD Measuring e-Commerce Size and Impact  
 
The use of broadband penetration as the principal metric for measuring delivery of the economic and 
social benefits of the Internet stems from the creation of the 1997 OECD document Measuring 
Electronic Commerce124.  The OECD proposed that electronic information exchange infrastructures 
form the foundation for accruing the benefits of electronic commerce, as shown in Figure A1, on the 
basis that without the enabling infrastructures, no benefits will accrue125.  This framework was 
expanded in 1999 to develop a time-bound framework whereby the national and international 
benefits of electronic commerce would emerge over time as countries passed through the three 
stages of Readiness for electronic commerce, Intensity of Internet use and reaping the Impacts of the 
policy126.   These documents together propose infrastructure penetration metrics as the best available 
proxies for measuring performance, as per Figure A2.    
 
From 1997, the OECD began collecting infrastructure penetration statistics in accordance with these 
frameworks.  To date, the OECD statistics and subsequent reports based upon them have been 
dominated by telephony-based Internet access proxies, almost certainly as a combined consequence 
of history and data availability rather than derivation from methodological accuracy.  In 1997, 
almost all Internet access from the end user perspective (residential consumers and businesses) was 
achieved via either dial-up modem across the PSTN or T-1 data lines leased from 
telecommunications providers.  Hence, telecommunications was the logical infrastructure for 
proxying value creation from connectivity in 1997.  In addition, information on telecommunications 
                                                     
124 Howell (2001) op. cit.  
125 Ibid, p. 19. 
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infrastructure penetration is a tangible measure127, readily available (usually from regulatory 
agencies), is approximately standardised across the OECD countries and the data collection 
methodology remains reasonably stable over time.  This has enabled reasonably timely and reliable 
cross-country and time series comparisons to be undertaken.   
 
Figure A2. Availability of e-Commerce Indicators Across OECD Countries 
 
 
Inter-country analysis has subsequently been undertaken almost exclusively using as its basis 
infrastructure proxies that reflect the availability of data as much as they accurately capture the 
underlying metric being measured – economic and social benefits arising from the use of electronic 
commerce.   However, as new technological platforms are developed via which end users can access 
the Internet, and as these new technologies enter production, sole reliance upon telecommunications 
infrastructures as proxies for benefit measurement becomes increasingly less credible and reliable.  
 
As an alternative, Boles de Boer, Evans and Howell (2000)128 suggest that no single infrastructure 
proxy alone can be used reliably, without testing its logical consistency in a form of triangulation 
with a variety of other proxies.  Many proxies pointing together in a similar direction provide a 
context within which to assess both the validity of, and consequently the weight that can be given to, 
the result of polling any one proxy.  Moreover, consistency amongst a variety of proxies makes it 
                                                     
127 It measures something physical that can be easily counted and is hard to dispute – Lev, Baruch.  2001.  Intangibles:  
Management, Measurement and Reporting.  Brookings Institution Press. 
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easier to identify anomalies and interesting deviations within the collection of proxies used, and 
thereby isolate possible explanations or identify useful areas of inquiry.   
 
Crawford (1997)129 identifies the primary functionality of the Internet as communication, mediated 
through digital information content transmitted via network usage of bandwidth.  By combining 
Crawford’s definition of the Internet, a consistent multi-proxy approach, a recognition of the 
dynamic nature of the technology adoption process and the presumption that the accrual of Impacts 
begins as soon as Readiness enables Intensity to occur, Howell (2001, 2003)130 has developed a 
framework that links infrastructure availability (Connectivity, measured as infrastructure 
penetration) with human capital and application availability (Capability) to derive utilisation 
measures (Uptake) to deliver benefits, determined by increases in productivity (Performance) 
resulting from the application of transferred information – Figure A3.   However, Connectivity, 
Uptake, and the subsequent benefits are not possible without investment having first occurred to 
create the infrastructure.  Connectivity is itself dependent upon another metric – Coverage.  
Infrastructure coverage defines the most basic indication of the ability to generate benefits, but 
coverage does not automatically lead to Connectivity (measured as Penetration), let alone Uptake 
(Utilisation) of the technology, as utilisation requires the presence of productivity-generating 
information-using applications.   
 
Whilst productivity benefits remain difficult to measure, Howell argues that all three elements 
(Connectivity, Capability and Uptake) are required to yield the performance benefits.  Electronic 
commerce Uptake (proxied as information movements over electronic infrastructures) provides the 
best indication of benefit accrual, as end users will not adopt electronic information exchange 
methods and applications unless the net benefits of doing so exceed those achieved using forerunner 
technologies and applications (that is, a productivity improvement or increased consumer welfare 
ensue from substituting the new technology for an existing application).   
 
This model also recognises the competitive process as the dynamic interaction of supply-side and 
demand-side factors.  Whereas infrastructure connectivity statistics proxy productivity 
improvements from the ‘bottom up’ supply side perspective, consumer purchases of technologies are 
determined principally by assessing whether adoption of an application increases productivity in the 
                                                     
129 Crawford, David W.  1997.  Internet Services: A Market for Bandwidth or Communication?  Chapter in McKnight, Lee 
W.; and Joseph P. Bailey (eds).  Internet Economics.  Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. p 
380.  
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first instance.  Benefit is derived from use of the application, which requires use also of a 
technology, but availability of the technology serves as a conditioner of the ability to make the 
choice to utilise it.  This is the demand side approach.  Consistency of proxies, as per Boles de Boer, 
Evans and Howell (2000), requires additional consistency in this dimension. 
 
Figure A3. Electronic Commerce Performance Measurement Framework 
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 A.1.2 Market: ‘Information’ or ‘Platform-Based Information’ Transfer? 
In addition to identifying the dynamic interactions of supply and demand side factors and the roles 
of infrastructure availability and utilisation proxies in assessing the extent of productivity benefits, 
the Howell measurement methodology brings into sharp relief the fact that demand for 
telecommunications infrastructures is a derived demand, based upon the demand for information to 
be transported to meet the needs of end user applications132.  Information is created and consumed 
independent of the telecommunications network that transports it, analogous to the cargoes carried 
by trucking firms between producers and consumers, or between participants in a supply chain.  
Whilst trucks and the roads on which they travel are important, they comprise just one component of 
the value chain133.   
 
Thus, information is the product of central concern in this transportation market.  Alternative 
technology platforms (of which telecommunications is but one) compete to move information, using 
vehicles of differing capacity depending upon customer requirements.  It appears far too simplistic 
to expect to understand the dynamics of the marketplace for information transport merely by 
attempting to understand the dynamics of one mode of information transfer. 
 
A.1.3 Telecommunications as Information Transportation 
At its most basic level, digitised information is the cargo of telecommunications.  Fixed and mobile 
voice telephony infrastructures enable information of one type – human-to-human voice 
communications  - to be transported.  Likewise, computer-to-computer information transfers over 
the Internet can also be handled.  In this sense, voice traffic is a subset of information traffic.  
Specific technologies for handling interfaces – e.g. fixed line voice, mobile voice – offer alternative 
ways of loading and offloading the same information to different locations and applications.  The 
local loop, T-1 leased lines, fibre, wireless and other technology platforms offer alternative networks 
over which computer to computer information can be transferred, either over the Internet or directly.  
In the trucking analogy, choosing a platform is like choosing road over rail. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
131 Economist Intelligence Unit.  2003.  The 2003 e-Readiness Rankings.  London: EIU.   
132 Bailey, Joseph P.  1997.  The Economics of Internet Interconnection Agreements.  Chapter in McKnight, Lee W.; and 
Joseph P. Bailey (eds).  Internet Economics.  Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  
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In this context, if road (telecommunications network) is selected, dial-up modems and DSL 
broadband represent merely two alternative sub technologies via which information can be 
transferred using the chosen platform - the local loop.  One (broadband) is merely faster and capable 
of moving physically larger quantities of information than the other.  Choosing broadband or dial-up 
rests upon which speed and capacity of truck is required to carry out the transportation task most 
efficiently (e.g. cost, timing, reliability) in relation to the other parts of the value-creating production 
function that the information is being transported to facilitate.   This is a function of the application, 
not the transport mechanism, and it is highly unlikely that one combination of transportation 
technologies will be optimal for all applications.   
 
LLU’s ability to influence economic growth via this market definition is analogous to increasing 
efficiency in the transportation market by manipulating the market for Mack trucks.  It will only 
work if there is a problem in the transport market that is suitable to be solved with Mack trucks.    
 
A.1.4 Role of Application Base 
Hence, the Internet is a subset of information transportation infrastructure, with broadband and dial-
up being substitute Internet transportation mechanisms.  Application use of information will dictate 
the quantity, quality, speed and timeliness of information exchange requirements, thereby setting the 
parameters for selecting the appropriate technologies.  Application-based demand is the necessary 
condition for information transfer to occur.  Absent applications, no transfer is required, irrespective 
of how available the transport technologies may be134.   
 
Applications of different types necessarily result in different transport choices.  Given that 
alternative transport choices exist, the user will choose the information transport method that yields 
the greatest productivity of the application.  Substitution from one to the other will occur only if the 
substitution is productivity-raising.  Given that transportation costs are only a very small part of the 
productivity deriving from the use of information, the ability of transport infrastructure providers to 
influence the choice of technology is relatively small, and usually confined to price (e.g. bundles of 
voice and Internet telephony, pricing arbitrage between platforms, flat-rate pricing).    Much more 
significant in the decision-making process in the choice between broadband and narrow-band 
technologies are the number of applications available to be used, the number of times each 
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application is used, the application learning levels of the user and the user’s valuation of time135.  It 
is noted that empirical analysis in the United States shows that Internet users place a very low value 
on their time, as they are prepared to spend only in the order of 0.5c a minute for faster downloading 
during leisure hours136.  The transport provider will have significant ability to influence the 
technology choice only if the operator can influence these user factors (e.g. influencing the 
application base by offering cable television entertainment content in an Internet access bundle)137.  
LLU is unable, by itself, to influence the application base or any of these other user-determined 
characteristics.   
 
However, there is a mounting body of evidence suggesting that the number of applications requiring 
the fast transfer speeds and greater transfer capacity of broadband is small, and the users who derive 
benefit from them not necessarily large in number.  Haring et al.138 (2002) observe “we would put 
our chips on demand rather than supply constraints, and on the relative paucity of applications as 
being the main ‘culprits’ restraining [broadband] take-up”, whilst Anderson et al. (2001)139 (in the 
UK), Howell (2003) and Howell and Obren (2002) (in New Zealand) and Varian (2002)140 (in the 
US) all find the applications used by mature and experienced residential broadband users are 
confined to a base of email, web browsing, entertainment downloading, interactive gaming and chat, 
much of which is not information transfer-intensive.  The business application base is even 
narrower, comprised of email, web browsing, limited dedicated applications such as B2B exchanges 
and supply chain integration141.  Moreover, Howell and O’Connell (2003)142 find that even in the 
extremely mature business broadband user market, aside from a limited number of information-
intensive specialist users such as filmmakers, radiography practices and ISPs, the application base is 
small, with few perceived applications with great future productivity benefits being considered for 
use in this market.   
 
                                                     
135 Howell and Obren (2002) op. cit.  
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A.1.5 Connection versus Utilisation 
Hence, given that application-based use of transported information determines the extent of 
economic value derived in an information economy, and together applications and infrastructure 
underpin the necessary demand supply and transportation conditions for creating that value, the 
question is ‘which metrics offer the best proxy for potential future value creation?’  Infrastructure 
penetration figures alone are clearly inadequate, and indeed can be potentially quite misleading if 
taken in isolation.  A connection to an infrastructure (measured as infrastructure Penetration) does 
not necessarily result in Uptake (Utilisation, measured as application-determined quantities of 
information transferred per connection).  The benefits of connection accrue from utilisation, not 
connection.  Hence, utilisation measures, presumably determined by productivity-generating use of 
applications, reflecting the interaction of supply-side availability of infrastructures and demand-side 
requirements for productivity-raising information exchanges, provide a more robust proxy for 
Performance. 
 
A.1.6 Is Broadband Penetration Per Se a Sound Policy Objective? 
Whilst the analysis methodologies all recognise the role of electronic communication infrastructures 
as necessary to the accrual of information-related productivity benefits in an ‘Information 
Economy’, it is far from clear that widespread connectivity to infrastructure of a specific speed or 
capacity (broadband) or of a specific technological base (telecommunications, as defined in the 
Issues Paper) in isolation from utilisation is sufficient as a stand-alone policy metric in assessing 
relative national productivity performance, let alone desirable as a targeted policy objective in its 
own right.   
 
Nonetheless, policymakers in most OECD jurisdictions have adopted ‘increasing the penetration of 
broadband technologies’ as the primary policy objective underpinning their ‘Information Economy’ 
initiatives143.  This policy imperative has translated into regulatory intervention in the form of LLU 
as this has been perceived as a strategy that has the potential to deliver increased performance in this 
metric, in the short term at least.   
                                                     
143 For example, 
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 Broadband Internet access has attracted attention as the connectivity infrastructure metric of 
preference in the current policy debate, as broadband technologies are the fastest and most capable 
mass-market Internet information exchange technologies so far developed.  As such, they are 
‘frontier technologies’ which have the potential to deliver greater benefit to certain users in certain 
usage circumstances144.  However, merely because a specific technology exists, it does not follow 
directly that universal uptake of the technology is required to generate optimum economic benefit.  
Does everyone need to invest in a Mack truck merely because it has the biggest cargo carrying 
capacity, or buy a Ferrari merely because it is fast, unless other factors indicate that this is an 
efficient investment strategy?  A more appropriate assessment of infrastructure performance arises 
from asking whether it is possible for those for whom the investment makes economic sense to 
access and use the technology.   Thus, measures of coverage and price may be better proxies than 
actual uptake.  If a consumer actually needs the capabilities of a Mack truck or a Ferrari, can that 
consumer access the technologies at prices that enable appropriate use? 
  
Individuals differ in their needs, tastes and objectives and select a portfolio of purchases within their 
budget constraints to maximise benefit, whilst firms will pursue a technology purchase strategy only 
if it increases profit (productivity).  It is only if adopting a new technology increases individual 
welfare or firm productivity that the investment is justified145.  Figure 3 illustrates how achieving 
these benefits in an Information Economy is contextually dependent upon the interaction of the 
availability of the technology, a need for the benefits offered by the technologies and the additional 
skills and resources (e.g. applications) required in addition to the technology to achieve the benefits.  
As with any investment strategy, optimal accrual of benefits requires the timing of investment in all 
necessary components to be co-ordinated.  Investing too soon in an expensive technology in advance 
of the additional requirements being available may result in costly assets lying under-utilised while 
capability in the complements is acquired, with associated negative productivity consequences146.    
These outcomes are very real possibilities when pursuit of one metric (biggest, fastest, newest) is 
pursued in isolation from the other contextual elements.   
 
If LLU is to be justified by achievement of such a single metric, there needs to be considerable 
certainty that benefit accrual is strongly contingent upon performance in that metric.  Otherwise, no 
                                                     
144 Helpman, Elhanan and Manuel Trajtenberg.  1996. Diffusion of General Purpose Technologies. National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper 5773.   
145 Howell and Obren (2002) op. cit.  
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matter how effective the policy is in delivering the metric, it will be impotent in delivering the 
ultimate objective. 
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Appendix 2. A Usage-Based Explanation for South Korea’s High 
Broadband Penetration  
This Appendix is an extract from the author’s paper ‘A New Zealand Response to the U.S. 
Broadband Problem’.   It is repeated here as an illustration of the differences in applications that 
arise in countries that apply differing regulatory and legislative policies, which translate into 
significant differences in specific performance metrics.  It also stands, as an example that emulation 
of the specific performance in a metric in which another country has excelled is not necessarily 
going to encourage the desired end result if the metric is a poor proxy of the desired outcome.   
 
The most probable explanation for South Korea’s high levels of broadband penetration lies in 
pricing arbitrage and application usage.  DSL and cable broadband in South Korea are considerably 
cheaper than dial-up or leased line alternatives, biasing customers towards use of these technologies.  
For example, South Koreans face charges twice those charged by United States ISPs for 40 hours 
per month dial-up access, while twice the number of megabytes can be downloaded via DSL per 
$US1 in South Korea than in the United States147.  Business use of DSL is also likely to be 
comparatively higher as leased lines prices for 2 Mbit/s lines in 2000 were the 3rd highest in the 
OECD.  High residential (2nd highest in the OECD), and business (highest in the OECD) 
international telephony charges make Internet-based voice applications such as voice-over-IP 
attractive.  Indeed, these applications enjoy high levels of use and are bundled with broadband 
services as part of the standard offerings by South Korean broadband providers148. 
 
More importantly from an applications perspective, however, is the analysis of what Koreans use 
their broadband connections for.  Voice-over-IP aside, there is considerable evidence that South 
Korea’s Internet and broadband uptake is attributable to residential rather than business demand.  
Whilst South Korea leads the OECD in broadband uptake and Internet subscribers per 100 
inhabitants, it lies 25th out of 28 in the number of Internet hosts per 1000 inhabitants – a measure of 
domain name-linked computers connected to the Internet, and hence a measure of business uptake.  
Similarly, South Korea is 17th in web sites per 1000 inhabitants and 25th in secure servers (required 
for secure business information transfer, including secure payments)149.  South Korean broadband 
purchase is almost certainly motivated by residential consumption, presumably entertainment.  On 
the evidence of website statistics and secure server numbers, South Korean businesses do not appear 
to be creating and transporting significant amounts of business-related information, relative to other 
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high business-use ranking OECD countries.  There is little evidence of significant quantities of web 
content being created in South Korea, or even that information is being consumed by businesses via 
secure servers.  Thus, information content consumed via broadband connections must be either 
created and consumed entirely within the consumption sector in South Korea (e.g. interactive 
gaming), or created elsewhere. 
 
Anecdotal evidence supports the contention that South Korea’s broadband connection rate reflects 
high demand for English language video and audio content not available via the more usual 
broadcast channels.  As South Korean law neither recognises nor enables enforcement of copyright 
granted in other jurisdictions in respect of video and audio material, there are few barriers to 
distribution of such material over the Internet. It is possible that South Korea’s high broadband 
uptake may be in large part a consequence of this material being made freely available as a substitute 
for other more costly entertainment (e.g. pay video and pay cable television) in an environment 
where other entertainment substitutes are limited.  Whilst in the short term this source of ‘free’ 
content may have had the effect of increasing South Korean broadband uptake, it adds little to 
measurable production for either South Korea or the country of content origin.  Indeed, in the long 
term, it threatens to reduce the total world stock of Internet content and consequently national and 
international welfare150.    
 
In the case of South Korea, attempting to identify consistency of the proxies in light of the 
productivity framework results in the recognition of an anomaly that serves to put significant doubt 
into the credibility of broadband penetration as the sole statistic upon which to base a policy such as 
LLU.  Rather, the triangulation serves as an added reinforcement of the presumption that the accrual 
of benefits in an information economy appear to be more strongly determined by demand-side 
application factors than supply-side infrastructure factors.  Championing South Korean 
achievements as the model to which other countries must aspire, and utilising LLU as a means to 
replicate them, in isolation from considering the applications-based productivity implications may be 
disastrous for economic welfare in the long-term.   
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